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The Emerging Legal Problem of Naturally Occurring
Asbestos and Washington State’s Swift Creek
Conundrum
Jean O. Melious†
Naturally occurring asbestos (NOA) is no different than asbestos
found in buildings and products. Although human exposure to any
asbestos is harmful, human exposure to NOA is particularly problematic because it occurs in varied locations, in varied forms, and
in varied quantities. Unlike the laws applicable to asbestos in the
occupational setting, the laws applicable to NOA are vague and often unhelpful. As a result, health professionals, regulators, and
lawyers find it difficult to advise communities about risk and liability issues. This article examines these issues in the context of NOA
in northwest Washington State. Specifically, a large landslide on
Sumas Mountain in rural Whatcom County deposits more than
100,000 cubic yards of soil containing NOA and heavy metals into
Swift Creek every year. Unfortunately, Swift Creek is part of an international river system that delivers NOA across farmlands,
through small towns, and into Canada. This is a particularly intractable problem because asbestos-laden soil will continue to slide into
Swift Creek for at least the next 400 years. As the river system continues to deposit NOA onto riverbanks, across farmland, and into
yards and basement, possible health risks to humans will need to be
addressed. Because the scale of this asbestos dilemma is particularly daunting, both in terms of the timeframe and of the affected geographical area, it highlights many of the difficulties of addressing
NOA and its effects on communities. This article evaluates applica† Jean Melious is an associate professor at Huxley College of the Environment, Western Washington University, and a partner at Nossman LLP. She received a J.D. from Harvard Law School and an
M.Phil. in Urban Design and Regional Planning from the University of Edinburgh. The author gratefully acknowledges the work of Douglas Naftz, who received his B.A. in Environmental Policy and
B.S. in Cellular Biology from Western Washington University in 2009. To fulfill the requirements
of the Honors Program, Mr. Naftz wrote his honors thesis on Swift Creek, and his research contributed substantially to this article. Thanks also to Stefan Freelan, Geographic Information Specialist at
Western Washington University, who conducted the analysis supporting the discussion of the costs
of acquiring property in the area affected by Swift Creek asbestos.
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ble laws and discusses the difficulties of piecing together a solution
to a problem that the legal system does not recognize. As agencies
and residents continue to grapple with the enormous Swift Creek
asbestos problem, hopefully those experiences will contribute to the
development of a more rational policy to address the difficult legal
and health issues raised by NOA.
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I. INTRODUCTION
[W]here we are right now is a seam between the authorities. And that’s
not an answer you want to hear, but to the extent I understand it, it’s
probably the reality.
—Mike McCormick, Seattle District Commander, U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers.1
1. Transcript of Swift Creek Meeting at Glen Echo Community Club 35 (Nov. 20, 2007)
[hereinafter Nov. 2007 Transcript], available at
http://yosemite.epa.gov/r10/CLEANUP.NSF/sites/sumasmtndocs/$FILE/Swift+Creek+Meeting+Tra
nscript_Nov2007.pdf.
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If there is a problem now, there must be a way to address it.
—Clifford Villa, Assistant Regional Counsel, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region 10.2

All asbestos occurs naturally, which makes the term “naturally
occurring asbestos” (NOA) somewhat misleading. Nonetheless, the
“natural” label is widely applied to asbestos minerals found in their
natural state—in bedrock or soils.3 Because NOA is “natural,” it is
difficult for many people to believe that exposure to asbestos in the
environment could be harmful, despite the fact that asbestos used in
manufactured products is known to harm health.4
The potential for human exposure to NOA is widespread
throughout the United States.5 According to the U.S. Geological Survey
(USGS), asbestos-containing minerals have been documented in twentyseven of fifty states,6 including a number of areas where development is
occurring rapidly. As a result, increased construction and land
development will generate dust that contains NOA, leading to potential
environmental health hazards from airborne asbestos.7
Asbestos has been regulated extensively in occupational settings
because of the acute health hazards it creates in that context. Asbestos in
the environment, however, exposes the many gaps in scientific
knowledge about asbestos and its toxicity and adds some
2. Minutes of the Whatcom Cnty. Council Special Surface Water Work Session 9 (July 18,
2006), available at http://www.co.whatcom.wa.us/council/2006/minutes/water_resources/
sw0718.pdf.
3. Bradley S. Van Gosen, U.S. Geological Survey, Reported Historic Asbestos Prospects, and
Natural Asbestos Occurrences in the Rocky Mountain States of the United States (Colorado, Idaho,
Montana, New Mexico, and Wyoming) (2007), http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2007/1182/pdf/Plate.pdf.
4. Jill J. Dyken & John S. Wheeler, ATSDR’s Experience with Community Exposure to ‘Naturally Occurring Asbestos’, 70 J. ENVTL. HEALTH 74 (2008).
5. Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, Dep’t of Health and Human Servs.,
Naturally Occurring Asbestos Locations in the Contiguous USA and Alaska and the 100 Fastest
Growing U.S. Counties (July 20, 2007), http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/noa/docs/usamap.pdf.
6. Jeff Slivka, Naturally Occurring Conditions Could Create Liability For Contractors, Insurers, NAT'L UNDERWRITER PROP. & CAS. INS. (July 27, 2009), http://www.propertycasualty360.com/
2009/07/27/naturally-occurring-conditions-could-create-liability-for-contractors-insurers; see also
Naturally Occurring Asbestos, AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE REGISTRY, DEP’T OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/NOA/where_is_asbestos_found.html (containing links to maps showing known deposits of NOA). In Washington State, “Swift Creek might
be the most well known landslide to contain asbestos but since asbestos occurs throughout Washington State, many other landslides have the potential to contain asbestos.” Landslides Potentially Containing Asbestos, SLIDING THOUGHT BLOG (July 9, 2009), http://slidingthought.wordpress.com/200
9/07/09/landslides-potentially-containing-asbestos/; see also Deep-Seated Landslides in Formations
that Contain Asbestos, SLIDING THOUGHT BLOG, http://slidingthought.files.wordpress.com/2009/07/
asbestos-landslides2.jpg.
7. R.J. Lee et al., Naturally Occurring Asbestos—A Recurring Public Policy Challenge, 153 J.
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 1, 2 (2007).
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epidemiological and ecological wrinkles of its own. The Agency for
Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR), a federal public health
agency that addresses exposure to hazardous substances in the
environment, summarized the problem of quantifying NOA exposure in
communities as follows:
Our knowledge of asbestos exposure and disease response
comes almost entirely from studies of asbestos workers who
experienced relatively high exposure to commercial-grade asbestos
materials regularly over quantifiable periods of time, usually for
many years. In contrast, NOA exposures occur to individuals of
diverse ages and backgrounds and typically occur at lower levels
and in an irregular or intermittent fashion.8

Health professionals and regulators find it difficult to advise
communities about the risks posed by NOA, leaving residents uncertain
about what risks they may face and what responses are appropriate.
Lawyers similarly may find it difficult to provide clients or communities
with clear advice about options and liabilities in this emerging legal
field, which incorporates some aspects of asbestos law (even when it is
not helpful in the environmental context) and excludes other aspects of
the law (even when they would be helpful in the environmental context).
Clients with asbestos-laden soils and communities that need to plan for
growth in areas with asbestos face uncertain liabilities based on risks that
are difficult to quantify.
This article examines these issues in the context of the
environmental and potential health problems created by NOA from the
crumbling serpentine face of Sumas Mountain in northwest Washington
State. Because the scale of this asbestos dilemma is particularly
daunting, both in terms of the timeframe and of the affected geographical
area, it highlights many of the difficulties of addressing NOA and its
effects on communities.
A large landslide on Sumas Mountain, believed to be the result of
natural forces, deposits more than 100,000 cubic yards of soil containing
chrysotile asbestos fibers and heavy metals into Swift Creek every year. 9
Asbestos-laden soils will slide into Swift Creek for at least the next 400–

8. Dyken & Wheeler, supra note 4.
9. PACIFIC SURVEYING AND ENGINEERING, INC., WHATCOM COUNTY DEP’T OF PUB. WORKS,
SWIFT CREEK SEDIMENT MANAGEMENT PLAN PROPOSED DESIGN 1 (March 30, 2011) [hereinafter
SEDIMENT MANAGEMENT PLAN], available at http://www.whatcomcounty.us/pds/plan/sepa/pdf/swi
ft-creek-sediment-mgmt-plan-final-20110330.pdf.
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600 years;10 in the words of an engineering report, the landslide
“represents a functionally unlimited sediment supply.”11
To complicate matters, Swift Creek is part of an international river
system that delivers asbestos from the landslide to Canada. Swift Creek
starts at the toe of the landslide and flows west for about four miles to its
confluence with the Sumas River. The Sumas River, in turn, meanders
roughly fifteen miles through agricultural land and past the small towns
of Nooksack and Sumas before reaching the Canadian border. Once in
Canada, the river flows through the city of Abbotsford, British
Columbia, before merging with the Fraser River ten miles north of the
border.12 As discussed below, the Canadian government and Canadian
scientists have been actively involved in Swift Creek research. To date,
however, Canada has not publicly advocated for a solution to the
problem, despite evidence that American asbestos has affected Canadian
rivers and farms.
When Swift Creek and the Sumas River flood, a fairly regular
occurrence, receding floodwaters coat farmland with asbestos-laden soils
and heavy metals. This can prevent crop growth. Until recently,
sampling along Swift Creek had indicated that asbestos levels in
sediments ranged from around one percent to as high as four percent. In
May 2009, however, samples along areas of the Sumas River that
flooded during the previous winter showed much higher concentrations.
Almost all samples contained at least ten percent asbestos, and the
percentage of asbestos in some samples reached twenty-seven percent.
By comparison, the federal workplace standard for asbestos exposure is
one percent, and federal health and environmental agencies state that
there is no safe level of exposure to asbestos.
The existence of such high levels of asbestos along the Sumas River
has caused concern among federal, state, and local agencies. Many of the
people who live along Swift Creek and the Sumas River, in contrast,
view the health risk as a figment of the environmental and health
officials’ imaginations. The nature of the risk that asbestos creates causes
this crucial disconnect between the agencies and the people that they
serve. People understand harm, especially harm to health, when they can
see it and when there is a clear cause-and-effect relationship. What harm
does NOA cause? In ten, twenty, or thirty years, some residents may
10. KERR WOOD LEIDAL ASSOCS., SWIFT CREEK BACKGROUND AND MANAGEMENT
ALTERNATIVES: REPORT TO WHATCOM COUNTY FLOOD CONTROL ZONE DISTRICT 1-1 (2008).
11. Id. at i.
12. DIV. OF HEALTH ASSESSMENT AND CONSULTATION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVS., HEALTH CONSULTATION: SWIFT CREEK SEDIMENT ASBESTOS, WHATCOM COUNTY,
WASHINGTON 4 (2006) [hereinafter HEALTH CONSULTATION], available at http://www.atsdr.cdc.go
v/hac/PHA/SwiftCreekSedimentAsbestos/SwiftCreekHC033006.pdf.
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suffer from one of the lung diseases associated with asbestos. Perhaps,
for any given individual, NOA exposure will result in no harm at all.
The discovery of asbestos in the soils, however, clearly has harmed
some property owners in the area. Their property is suddenly worth
much less, and they can do less with it. Although asbestos-laden
sediments continue to clog Swift Creek, government agencies no longer
allow the creek to be dredged. The immediate harms of flooding and of
the legal uncertainty surrounding NOA appear, to some residents, to be
far worse than the health risks.
As a result, residents often view the agencies charged with
protecting them as the sources of their problems. As one citizen stated at
a public meeting:
I, and I'm speaking for myself but others may have the same
sentiment, don't believe your fuzzy science. I'm living proof. I've
been here since the '60s. I've played in it, worked in it, hauled it, ate
it as a kid, and I have not suffered any ill health. And that's what
people—see, they don't believe you and they don't like to be told
what to do. I don't like to be told what to do with gravel on my own
property. I need some fill. Now I can't even touch it and I'm too
cheap to buy it, so what I've got here is a problem.13

Although some members of the public blame the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) for creating the problem of asbestos, and many
residents may wish that the agencies would just go away, neither the
agencies nor the public will be able to close the Pandora’s box of
potentially dangerous contamination. Health and environmental agencies
cannot say with certainty that exposure to asbestos at the levels found
along Swift Creek and the Sumas River is safe, and as long as that is the
case, the area remains under a cloud. Even if there is no immediate harm,
the prospect of harm creates a problem. Out of fairness to the residents
and property owners along Swift Creek and the Sumas River, the
identification of a problem ought to lead to the timely development of a
solution.
Unfortunately, existing law does not provide a clear solution. As
discussed below, the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA),14 often referred to as the
Superfund law, could impose liability for exposure to asbestos resulting
from human activities that artificially disrupt asbestos-laden soils. In
Whatcom County, this could include creek dredging that has occurred
13. Nov. 2007 Transcript, supra note 1, at 59.
14. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
9601–9675 (2010). See infra text accompanying notes 143–84, for a discussion of CERCLA and its
applicability to NOA.
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since the 1940s and the subsequent use of dredge spoils for unknown,
but presumably widespread, purposes. However, Superfund liability
raises several knotty problems.
The primary problem is that there is no dumper, no polluter, and no
big company making money by externalizing the costs of its
environmental harm. Although humans have dredged the creek and
moved the soils, nature is the primary “responsible party.” The only
potentially liable parties are government agencies and private individuals
who behaved rationally, even responsibly, in response to a natural threat.
This raises the second problem with Superfund liability: there are very
few entirely clean hands. A number of agencies, at various levels, have
authorized or have been involved in actions that disturbed asbestosbearing soils over the years. It would be difficult for any agency to
attempt to impose liability on any other party without raising questions
about its own role. Finally, the likely costs of liability are so high that no
potentially liable party would be able to provide sufficient resources.
One hypothetical option would be to attack the problem at its
source by building structures or channeling water to prevent the release
of NOA from the landslide on Sumas Mountain. As discussed below,
however, engineering solutions are expensive and may not even provide
a permanent solution to the problem.
The United States Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) may have a
role to play. The Corps has suggested that its ecosystem restoration
authority could help address the Swift Creek watershed. Two immediate
practical problems plague this authority: first, the Corps’ cost-benefit
requirements do not favor spending large sums of public money in
sparsely populated areas; and second, a local partnership requirement
would impose costs on cash-strapped local or state agencies.
A state-of-the-art proposal for a solution to Swift Creek might
include land use planning to avoid increased exposure to asbestos-laden
soils, the construction of a sediment trap to reduce short-term threats,
and acquisition of the properties that are most significantly affected.
Reflecting the unusual circumstances of the problem—the property is
almost all in private ownership, and some riverbank homes are in small
towns—the property within the hazard area could be subject to a longterm buyout program. The cost of such a program, while high, would be
much lower than any other alternative.
There is no legal obligation for any agency to create or fund a
buyout program, however, and no obvious funding source. Absent
evidence of immediate harm, there is no constituent pressure; in fact,
many constituents likely would oppose such a program. Under these
circumstances, dedicating public funds to the purchase of property in a
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sparsely populated area in response to a problem that is largely outside
the focus of major media is unlikely.
Basic fairness calls for such a solution, however, because the status
quo is not likely to be kind to property owners affected by NOA. Real
estate laws require owners to disclose asbestos in or on property,15 and
buyers are likely unwilling to accept the risk of asbestos except at a
discount. A buyout program could ensure that landowners were offered
reasonable compensation, constituting both a prudent long-term fiscal
policy for the public sector and the assurance of fair treatment of
innocent landowners.
II. ASBESTOS RISKS AND INFORMATION GAPS
Looking around the room, I've been here longer than anybody here. I've
walked on this dirt and I've drank water out of the wells and I think I'm
the healthiest individual in the room.
—Vernon Leibrant, Resident, Whatcom County, Washington.16

A. How Dangerous Is Naturally Occurring Asbestos?
The risk from NOA is difficult to quantify, difficult to
communicate, and difficult for citizens to understand. Exemplifying this
difficulty is a government publication on NOA, titled Limiting
Environmental Exposure to Asbestos in Areas with Naturally Occurring
Asbestos.17 The fact sheet asks, “How could asbestos exposure make you
sick?” and responds, “Important! Being exposed to asbestos does not
mean you will develop health problems.”18 These apparently conflicting
messages—that asbestos may make you sick, but then again, it may
not—reflect the scientific uncertainty about asbestos and its effects, as
well as the difficulty of predicting exposure to NOA.
1. Definition and Detection of Asbestos Fibers
Among the many factors that play into the uncertainties
surrounding the health effects of NOA is the fact that the term “asbestos”
does not clearly delineate the minerals of concern. Asbestos can be
defined as follows:
15. WASH. REV. CODE § 64.06.013 (2010).
16. Nov. 2007 Transcript, supra note 1, at 37.
17. AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE REGISTRY, U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVS., LIMITING ENVIRONMENTAL EXPOSURE TO ASBESTOS IN AREAS WITH NATURALLY
OCCURRING ASBESTOS, http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/noa/docs/Asbestos%20LimitExp_ENG_web.pdf.
18. Id. at 2.
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[C]ertain minerals that have crystallized in a finely fibrous habit, in
bundles of easily separable fibers and/or fibers which are composed
of smaller diameter fibrils, and with a hair-like elongated shape
resembling organic fibers, with exceptionally smooth faces and
displaying unusual adamantine or silky luster.19

The term “asbestos” was defined by industry to refer to minerals
that were commercially exploited.20 Asbestos fibers historically have
been classified into two main mineralogical groups: serpentine and
amphibole. Chrysotile, by far the predominate form of asbestos present
at Swift Creek, is the only type of serpentine fiber and accounted for
ninety-five percent of commercial asbestos applications.21
Chrysotile asbestos has relatively long and flexible fibers,
compared to the shorter, more brittle fibers of the amphibole variety.22
Asbestos is narrowly defined by regulatory agencies, including EPA and
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), as fibers
that are at least five micrometers (!m) in length with an aspect ratio
greater than or equal to 3:1.23 This regulatory definition of asbestos
appears to be based not on epidemiological or clinical health data, but on
the physical detection limits of the technology that was used to identify
asbestos at the time that the regulations were developed.24 The majority
19. Martin Harper, 10th Anniversary Critical Review: Naturally Occurring Asbestos, 10 J.
ENVTL. MONITORING 1394, 1394 (2008).
20. Id.
21. ROBERT VIRTA, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, ASBESTOS: GEOLOGY, MINERALOGY, MINING
AND USES (2002), available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2002/of02-149/of02-149.pdf. There are five
types of amphibole minerals, including actinolite, anthophyllite, grunerite (amosite is the asbestiform version), riebeckite (crocidolite is the asbestiform version), and tremolite. Harper, supra note
19, at 1394. Actinolite fibers have been found in some Swift Creek-related soil samples. JULIE
WROBLE, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING FOR ASBESTOS:
SUMAS MOUNTAIN ASBESTOS SITE SELECTED RESIDENTIAL PROPERTIES 3 (2011), available at
http://www.epa.gov/region10/pdf/sites/sumasmountain/asbestos_monitoring_report_april2011.pdf.
Other minerals, including talc and various lesser-known minerals that were not commercially exploited, may also have an asbestiform habit. Harper, supra note 19, at 1394–95. “Asbestiform”
describes the shape assumed by crystals of minerals when they form as thin-hair-like fibers. Lee,
supra note 7.
22. AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE REGISTRY, U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVS., TOXICOLOGICAL PROFILE FOR ASBESTOS 2 (2001) [hereinafter TOXICOLOGICAL
PROFILE], available at http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxprofiles/tp61.pdf.
23. HEALTH CONSULTATION, supra note 12, at 6.
24. “The limit of [one] percent asbestos by weight for ACM is a somewhat arbitrary level and
was chosen because of technological constraints (i.e., polarized light microscopy (PLM) could not
detect asbestos levels below this level).” ANTHONY PERRY, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, A
DISCUSSION OF ASBESTOS DETECTION TECHNIQUES FOR AIR AND SOIL: REPORT PREPARED FOR
OFFICE OF SUPERFUND REMEDIATION AND TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION (2004). The scientific bases
of NOA regulations thus appear to be rather tenuous, and based largely on industrial standards that
were formulated using outdated PLM technology. The instrument capability derives from Phase
Contrast Microscopes (PCM), which are most commonly used to analyze asbestos samples originat-
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of asbestos fibers identified at Swift Creek are shorter than five
micrometers in length.25 While such fibers do not meet the regulatory
definition of asbestos, it has not been established that they do not have
health impacts.26 Because health and environmental agencies regulate
asbestos based on outdated technological constraints, and because the of
the limited knowledge of the effect of the shorter fibers prevalent at
Swift Creek, existing regulatory standards do not adequately address the
real risk of asbestos at the site.
2. Health Risks from Asbestos
Asbestos fibers are dangerous when inhaled because the fibers
lodge in the lungs. They can remain there for a lifetime, damaging the
lungs or lung lining. Although asbestos is associated with asbestosis
(pneumoconiosis), a scarring of the lungs caused by exposure to
relatively large asbestos concentrations in the workplace, lung cancer
and mesothelioma are the major health concerns related to asbestos in
the environment.27 Mesothelioma is a cancer of the tissue that lines the
lungs, stomach, heart, and other organs.28 ATSDR, the federal agency
that compiles such data, describes mesothelioma as a “relatively rare”
cancer primarily associated with exposure to asbestos. Lung cancer, in
contrast, is the leading cause of cancer-related death, accounting for
about twenty-nine percent of all cancer deaths. Cigarette smoking is by
far the most important risk factor for lung cancer, and cigarette smoking

ing from industrial activity. Id. Transmission electron microscopy is more efficient. It can identify
fibers at 30,000 times magnification, where an optical microscope can only identify fibers at 400
times magnification. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT, EPA’S ACTIONS CONCERNING
ASBESTOS-CONTAMINATED VERMICULITE IN LIBBY, MONTANA 2001-S-7 20 (2001), available at
http://www.nycosh.org/workplace_hazards/epa-oig-montana.pdf. Electron microscopy is capable of
resolving asbestos fibers smaller than five micrometers in length, but is considerably more expensive than PCM. ECOLOGY & ENV’T, INC., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, SUMMARY REPORT OF EPA
ACTIVITIES, SWIFT CREEK ASBESTOS SITE, WHATCOM COUNTY, WASHINGTON 3-1
(2007) [hereinafter 2007 EPA SUMMARY REPORT], available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/r10/CLEA
NUP.NSF/sites/sumasmtndocs/$FILE/Final+Report.pdf. When electron microscopes are used to
analyze asbestos samples, fibers are counted in Polarized Light Microscope Equivalents (PCME),
and only those fibers meeting the strict regulatory definition are included in the final count. Id.
25. 2007 EPA SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 24, at 6-3.
26. ATSDR has observed:
[A]nalyses of autopsied human lung tissue of asbestos-exposed and non-exposed patients
often show greater numbers of short (< 5 !m) than long (> 5 !m) retained fibers, and
short chrysotile fibers have been reported to be the most prevalent type of fibers found in
parietal pleura tissue from asbestos-exposed autopsy cases.
TOXICOLOGICAL PROFILE, supra note 22, at F-23 (citations omitted).
27. Harper, supra note 19, at 1394.
28. Mesothelioma, NAT’L INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/mesot
helioma.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2011).
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combined with asbestos exposure greatly increases the likelihood of lung
cancer.29
Diseases from asbestos exposure take a long time to develop. Signs
or symptoms of asbestos-related disease usually do not appear for ten to
twenty years,30 and mesothelioma has a thirty- to fifty-year latency
period.31 When symptoms do appear, however, they may resemble the
symptoms of other diseases. There is no effective treatment for
asbestosis, which may lead to respiratory failure and death over twelve to
twenty-four years. Mesothelioma is usually associated with an extremely
poor prognosis.32
According to ATSDR, all types of asbestos cause cancer, but the
amphibole type is considered the most toxic.33 There is no conclusive
epidemiological data that supports this statement, however, and EPA
does not differentiate between fiber types when assessing risk of asbestos
exposure.34 The International Agency for Research on Cancer has
concluded that all commercial asbestos fibers cause lung cancer and
mesothelioma, and has found sufficient evidence that asbestos also
causes laryngeal and ovarian cancers.35 Likewise, the World Health
Organization (WHO) has concluded that all forms of asbestos, including
chrysotile, cause cancer. WHO notes that no threshold has been
identified for the carcinogenic risk of chrysotile and recommends
avoiding work likely to disturb asbestos fibers.36 Australia, New
Zealand, and all countries in the European Union have banned
chrysotile.37
Uncertainties regarding asbestos risk, intertwined with politics,
have precluded asbestos bans in the United States and Canada. Asbestos
is an overtly political issue in Canada, where a large mine in Quebec
produces chrysotile asbestos for export, and the federal government
subsidizes the Chrysotile Institute, a Quebec-based advocacy group
29. Asbestos: Health Effects, AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES & DISEASE REGISTRY (April 1,
2008), http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/asbestos/asbestos/health_effects/.
30. Id.
31. Mesothelioma, supra note 28.
32. Mesothelioma-Malignant, NAT’L INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlin
eplus/ency/article/000115.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2011).
33. TOXICOLOGICAL PROFILE, supra note 22, at 1.
34. Interview by Douglas Naftz with Julie Wroble, Toxicologist, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency
(Mar. 2, 2009).
35. T.L. Ogeden, Canadian Chrysotile Report Released—At Last, ANNALS OCCUPATIONAL
HYGIENE 1, 3 (2009).
36. WORLD HEALTH ORG., ELIMINATION OF ASBESTOS-RELATED DISEASES 2 (Sept. 2006),
available at http://www.who.int/occupational_health/publications/asbestosrelateddiseases.pdf.
37. Mia Rabson, Stop Paying to Promote Asbestos Use, Martin Urges, WINNIPEG FREE PRESS,
Nov. 6, 2011, http://www.winnipegfreepress.com/local/stop-paying-to-promote-asbestos-usemartin-urges-88532167.html.
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established in 1984 to promote the use of chrysotile.38 In 2007, Health
Canada, the Canadian federal health department, convened an “expert
panel” of scientists with varied views on the health risks of chrysotile
exposure.39 The panel’s report, which contained cautious statements
suggesting that several sources indicate that chrysotile probably causes
lung cancer, was withheld from publication for over a year. This
prompted the panel’s British chair to observe, “[t]he unexplained long
delay in publishing the Canadian report illustrates that chrysotile risk is
still a political issue, but the table and other aspects of the report
illustrate the wide measure of agreement that now exists on the
science.”40 Canada has since led the effort to block the designation of
asbestos as a hazardous substance under the Rotterdam Convention, an
international treaty that imposes disclosure and trade requirements on
listed substances.41
In the United States, EPA attempted to phase out and ban the
manufacture, import, processing, and distribution of asbestos products in
1989,42 but the Fifth Circuit overruled the attempted ban two years later
in Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA.43 The court recognized that “[a]n
EPA-appointed panel reviewed over one hundred studies of asbestos and
. . . concluded that asbestos is a potential carcinogen at all levels of
exposure, regardless of the type of asbestos or the size of the fiber.”44
The court held, however, that EPA “presented insufficient evidence” to
justify the ban,45 reasoning that EPA had not sufficiently balanced
asbestos’ toxic effects on health and the environment against the benefits
of asbestos, the availability of substitutes, and the economic
consequences of the rule.46 Characterizing EPA’s proposed ban as the
38. Id.
39. HEALTH CANADA, CHRYSOTILE ASBESTOS CONSENSUS STATEMENT AND SUMMARY:
CHRYSOTILE ASBESTOS EXPERT PANEL (Mar. 2008).
40. Ogeden, supra note 35.
41. Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous
Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade, opened for signature Sept. 10, 1998, 2244 U.N.T.S
337; see Steve Rennie, Harper Parties in Mining Town as Canada Keeps Asbestos off Hazardous
List, GLOBE AND MAIL, Jun. 24, 2011, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/harperparties-in-mining-town-as-canada-keeps-asbestos-off-hazardous-list/article2074399/.
42. Asbestos; Manufacture, Importation, Processing, and Distribution in Commerce Prohibitions, 54 Fed. Reg. 29,460, 29,468 (July 12, 1989) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 763).
43. Corrosion Proof Fittings v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 947 F.2d 1201, 1214–15 (5th Cir.
1991). Note that in their amicus briefs, Canada and Quebec opposed EPA’s proposed ban; however,
the court held that Canadian entities, including a Canadian mining company, did not have standing.
Id. at 1208–09.
44. Id. at 1207.
45. Id. at 1214–15.
46. Id. at 1216; see also id. at 1223 (“EPA, in its zeal to ban any and all asbestos products, basically ignored the cost side of the TSCA equation.”).
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“death penalty alternative”47 (referring to the “death” of asbestos under
the ban), the court held that EPA had not sufficiently established that less
burdensome alternatives would be insufficient. The first Bush
Administration did not appeal the court’s ruling, and manufacturers still
use asbestos in consumer products in the United States, including brake
pads and clutch linings.48
Although the last U.S. asbestos mine closed in 2002, the United
States imported 2530 metric tons of asbestos in 2005, along with 90,000
metric tons of products that contain it.49 Washington Senator Patty
Murray introduced a bill to ban asbestos in 2002. The bill, Ban Asbestos
in America Act, S. 742, 110th Cong. (2007), passed the Senate in 2007,
but has not become law.50
3. Exposure to and Epidemiology of Naturally Occurring Asbestos
NOA is found in a number of areas in the United States and around
the world. The USGS and ATSDR have documented NOA in more than
half of the states, including much of the West Coast.51
Several of the areas investigated by ATSDR and EPA involve
mining, which entails more intense occupational exposure than the Swift
Creek asbestos situation. The infamous vermiculite mine in Libby,
Montana, was so heavily contaminated with taconite asbestos that it
caused asbestos-related disease affecting at least 1200 Libby residents.52
Additionally, mines in Minnesota, New Jersey, and Alaska have also
created health concerns.53 A taconite mine at Silver Bay, Minnesota,
released predominately short asbestos fibers in the air. Although these
47. Id. at 1215.
48. Mesothelioma and Asbestos Risk for Auto Mechanics, SURVIVING MESOTHELIOMA: A
PATIENT’S GUIDE (March 19, 2010), http://www.survivingmesothelioma.com/news/view.asp?ID=00
111.
49. David Whitney, Senate is Close to a Deal on a Bill to Ban the Use of Asbestos, KNIGHTRIDDER WASH. BUREAU (June 12, 2007), available at 2007 WLNR 10969779.
50. Senator Patty Murray, Ban Asbestos in America, http://murray.senate.gov/public/index.cfm
/banasbestosinamerica (last visited Nov. 22, 2011). Senator Murray has observed: “As I’ve pushed
my bill in Congress, one of the biggest hurdles has been the senators’ and representatives’ assumption that asbestos was banned long ago.” Jennifer L. Leonardi, It’s Still Here! The Continuing Battle
over Asbestos in America, 16 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 129, 130 (2005). Concerns over the scope and expense of asbestos lawsuits, as well as the economic and political strength of the asbestos lobby, have
also contributed to the continued use of asbestos in the United States. Id. at 146.
51. See, e.g., Van Gosen, supra note 3; Bradley S. Van Gosen, U.S. Geological Survey, Reported Historic Asbestos Mines, Historic Asbestos Prospects, and Other Natural Asbestos Occurrences in Oregon and Washington (2010), http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2010/1041/downloads/Plate.pdf.
52. Bianca Forde, Revisiting Asbestos-Contaminant Exposure, Regulation, and Reckoning:
When Death is in the Air, 35 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 289, 290 (2008). See generally ANDREW
SCHNEIDER & DAVID MCCUMBER, AN AIR THAT KILLS: HOW THE ASBESTOS POISONING OF LIBBY,
MONTANA UNCOVERED A NATIONAL SCANDAL (2008).
53. Harper, supra note 19, at 1401–03.
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fibers, like many of the fibers detected at Swift Creek, were shorter than
the five-micrometer standard in some asbestos regulations, some experts
contend that these shorter fibers create a health risk that is as yet
unrecognized by the antiquated asbestos regulatory scheme.54 In Ambler,
Alaska, the asbestos-containing tailings of a mine were used to create
unpaved gravel roads,55 similar to the use of dredged materials for
numerous purposes in the Swift Creek area.
Most of the regulatory activity concerning NOA has focused on the
El Dorado Hills area of California, about twenty miles east of
Sacramento.56 Asbestos there is sequestered in subsurface mineral
deposits, where it can be released when disturbed by soil excavation,
driving on dirt roads, or detonation of explosives to clear land.
NOA was first identified in El Dorado County in the 1980s along
serpentine-rich dirt roads, which EPA subsequently paved to limit
exposure.57 In 1998 and 1999, officials discovered that asbestos
concentrations in air samples taken near the Golden Sierra High School
in El Dorado County exceeded state air quality limits for asbestos,
posing a health risk.58 These findings prompted the California Air
Resources Board to increase sampling in the area, and culminated with
activity-based sampling by EPA in October 2004.59 The State of
California and County of El Dorado responded by enacting regulations to
reduce and mitigate activities likely to create airborne dust.
Outside the United States, studies and reports of inhabitants
exposed to NOA indicate the possibility of health risks. Studies in South
Africa and Western Australia, where commercial asbestos mining
occurred, found that residents who were not involved in mining had
elevated disease risks. As noted in an article reviewing these studies,
however, “[i]n the mining regions, it is obviously more difficult to
separate out the potential for exposure and disease from the simple
presence of asbestos in the soils and rocks in the absence of mining
54. Id. at 1401.
55. Id. at 1402.
56. This area contains deposits of asbestos associated with ultramafic serpentine rock formations along the West Bear Mountains Fault, which runs north to south within El Dorado County.
KAREN LADD, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EL DORADO HILLS NATURALLY OCCURRING ASBESTOS
MULTIMEDIA EXPOSURE ASSESSMENT: EL DORADO HILLS, CALIFORNIA 2-1 (2005).
57. AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE REGISTRY, HEALTH CONSULTATION
PUBLIC COMMENT RELEASE FOR EVALUATION OF COMMUNITY-WIDE ASBESTOS EXPOSURES 3
(2010), available at http://www.edcoe.k12.ca.us/supts/whats_new/asbestos/documents/ATSDRHealt
hConsultation_EDH_32910.pdf.
58. DEP’T OF TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL, REPORT ON SURFACE SOIL SAMPLING FOR
NATURALLY OCCURRING ASBESTOS GARDEN VALLEY, CALIFORNIA 1 (2002), available at http://w
ww.dtsc.ca.gov/SiteCleanup/Projects/upload/Garden-Valley_REP_Soil_10-02.pdf.
59. LADD, supra note 56, at 5-3.
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activities.”60 Other reports from several regions of the world where
mining never occurred, but where many different forms of asbestos were
found, have shown elevated risks of disease.61
Health risks from NOA come from exposure, and the exposure
pathway of greatest concern is inhalation. For exposure through
inhalation to occur, asbestos must become airborne.62 Swift Creek
appears to be unique in the world as a delivery system for airborne
asbestos. In other areas, including El Dorado Hills in California, asbestos
fibers are not likely to be airborne until some human activity—building,
farming, driving off-road vehicles that kick up dust—disturbs the soils.
In contrast, the landslide on Sumas Mountain continually disturbs
asbestos-containing soils, which are then distributed by the flooding of
Swift Creek and the Sumas River. The flooding creates new layers of
asbestos-laden soils that are not contained under vegetation, under soils,
or within rocks. Floods deposit asbestos-laden soils in residents’ yards
and basements and in city storm drains. The intrusion of these asbestosladen soils into people’s living spaces creates possibilities of exposure
unlike any other in the world, making it particularly difficult to estimate
the risk from NOA in this region.
III. THE HISTORY OF NATURALLY OCCURRING ASBESTOS AT SWIFT
CREEK
I've talked to the members of my staff, I've talked to the EPA, and this is
one of the rare places in the United States that, yeah, there's asbestos
occurring, naturally occurring in very many places around the country.
But this is one of the very few places where water is impacting with the
naturally occurring asbestos and then transporting it to various places.
—Colonel Mike McCormick, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.63

A. Geography and Geology
Swift Creek is located in the far northwestern corner of the United
States. Canada borders Whatcom County to the north, the Pacific Ocean
borders the county to the west, and the rugged Cascade Mountains

60. Harper, supra note 19, at 1396.
61. Countries reporting exposure to fibrous minerals, not all of which fall within the traditional
definition of asbestos, include Turkey, Greece, Cyprus, Austria, Corsica, Afghanistan, Italy, New
Caledonia, China, Japan, Bulgaria, and Finland. Id. For example, in Bulgaria, tobacco farmers
whose soils contained mineral fibers showed pleural plaques. Id.
62. Id. at 1398.
63. Nov. 2007 Transcript, supra note 1, at 37.
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dominate the eastern part of the county. Seattle is about ninety miles to
the south; Vancouver, British Columbia, is about fifty miles to the north.
Moving water crisscrosses this predominately rural landscape. Swift
Creek’s headwaters are on Sumas Mountain, a forested ridge of
serpentine rock that marks the transition between flat farmland and the
Cascade Mountains. In the late 1930s, a landslide took place on Sumas
Mountain64—not a single slide, but the start of an ongoing, massive,
slow-moving shifting of soil and rocks. No artificial trigger has been
associated with the Sumas Mountain landslide, and engineers assume
that a natural event, seismic or hydrological, probably triggered the
landslide.65 Whatever the reason, the Swift Creek landslide has not been
susceptible to the apportionment of blame.
The asbestos found in Swift Creek comes from the bedrock geology
of the landslide. The serpentinite minerals on Sumas Mountain contain a
significant proportion of asbestos. Asbestos fibers weather easily,
breaking down into sediments that the landslide deposits in Swift Creek.
Of the sediment load that reaches Swift Creek, engineers have estimated
that forty-four percent of the particles are larger than sand.66 These
particles are transported along the bottom of the streambed as bedload,
which probably poses little hazard to humans; as for other species,
salmon have not been found in Swift Creek since the 1970s.67
The problem is that much of the sediment load consists of “fine
sediments,” and most of the fine sediments consist of chrysotile fibers.68
64. The earliest aerial photographs showing landslide activity at Swift Creek were taken in
1940, and interpretation of the photographs indicates that landslide activity probably began in the
late 1930s. KERR WOOD LEIDAL, supra note 10, at 4-2.
65. Landslides are usually triggered by single events, including earthquakes, hydrological
events such as heavy rainfall or stream erosion, or an artificial trigger, such as excavation or blasting. Id. at 4-3. One theory is that a strong earthquake in 1872 may have created conditions favorable
to the infiltration of water during particularly heavy rains from 1930 through 1932. Id.
66. Id. at 4-11. Efforts are ongoing to characterize the sediments and their transport. A recent
study observed that fine sediments constituted a far smaller percentage of the bedload, but also noted
difficulties in measurement:
The erosion rate of the SCL was estimated to be 158 mm [per year], while the erosion
rate of just the unvegetated toe, where most of the suspended sediment is presumed to
originate, is approximately 1 m [per year]. The annual suspended sediment yield estimated to be approximately 910 t [per square kilometer, per year], is only about 5% of the
bedload estimate. The suspended sediment yield is probably an underestimation because
of the inability to sample during several of the large rain events and because of the inclusion of debris flow deposits in the bedload estimate.
Tovah M. Bayer & Scott Linneman, The Nature and Transport of the Fine-Grained Component of
Swift Creek Landslide, Northwest Washington, 36 EARTH SURFACE PROCESSES AND LANDFORMS
624, 637 (2011).
67. See infra, text accompanying note 78.
68. Bayer & Linneman, supra note 66, at 624, 673 (“The chrysotile fibers . . . make up at least
50%, by volume, of the suspended load transported in Swift Creek . . . .”) (“The fine-grained com-
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Fine sediments travel in suspension in the water column. Swift Creek
transports chrysotile fibers into the Sumas River, which bisects small
towns en route to crossing the border into Canada, where it eventually
merges into the Fraser River. It is becoming increasingly clear that
asbestos fibers hitch a ride along this entire route.69
B. The 1950s Through the 1970s: Floods and the Discovery of Asbestos
The Sumas Mountain landslide quickly clogged Swift Creek with
sediment. During the 1950s, Whatcom County conducted drainage
studies on Swift Creek.70 In the mid-1960s, the federal Soil Conservation
Service, the predecessor to the Natural Resources Conservation Service,
conducted several studies of Swift Creek sediments and the effects of
sedimentation. It concluded that landslide stabilization was not feasible
and recommended the construction of levees to keep Swift Creek within
its banks.71
Swift Creek did not, however, stay in its banks, and the 1970s were
Swift Creek’s high water mark in more ways than one. Severe flooding
focused attention on Swift Creek and its sediments. By the end of the
1970s, asbestos had been identified in both sediments and the water.
Government agencies knew of the likely transport of asbestos to Canada
through the river system, and the most comprehensive study of potential
engineering approaches to the landslide conducted to date was
completed. Almost everything that is known about Swift Creek was
known in the 1970s, at least in broad outline.
A debris flow carrying 150,000 cubic yards of sediment clogged
Swift Creek in 1971, flooding adjacent fields. In response, the Corps
built levees, berms, and training dikes for most of the floodplain reach of
Swift Creek.72 In the first recorded episode of sediment removal, the
Corps dredged Swift Creek.73
Dikes, levees, berms, and dredging did not, of course, affect the
source of the sediment: the landslide on Sumas Mountain. The Corps
ponent of the [Swift Creek Landslide] is predominantly chrysotile with minor amounts of lizardite,
illite, chlorite and occasionally hydrotalcite.”).
69. KERR WOOD LEIDAL, supra note 10, at 4-8 to -9. The Soil Conservation Service estimated
that around 230,000 cubic yards of sediment had been deposited in the Sumas River from Swift
Creek over the thirty-year period that preceded 1965, and proposed a location for a sedimentation
basin to reduce the rate of sedimentation. CONVERSE DAVIS DIXON ASSOCS., INC., PHASE II
SUBMITTAL, GEOLOGIC AND ENGINEERING ANALYSIS, SWIFT CREEK TRIBUTARIES, SUMAS RIVER
WATERSHED, WHATCOM COUNTY, WASHINGTON 11 (Dec. 1975) (on file with author).
70. KERR WOOD LEIDAL, supra note 10, at 2-6.
71. Id. at 2-9.
72. CONVERSE DAVIS DIXON, supra note 69, at 12.
73. The Corps excavated 70,000 cubic yards of bedload from the Swift Creek channel. Id. at 6;
KERR WOOD LEIDAL, supra note 10, at 2-9.
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examined the landslide in 1971, evaluating engineering options and costs
for the “remediation” of the landslide, but determined that the project
was not economically justified.74 No action was taken, and Swift Creek
flooded severely again four years later. In 1975, a large flood left a
twelve- to twenty-inch layer of sediments in agricultural fields.75
That same year, in response to large, destructive floods, the Soil
Conservation Service hired a geotechnical consulting firm, Converse
Davis Dixon Associates, to evaluate the feasibility of engineering
solutions to the landslide project.76 The firm’s geotechnical report now
provides a snapshot of Swift Creek at the midpoint of its chronology,
approximately thirty-five years after the landslide began and
approximately thirty-five years ago. The report described the landslide as
“teardrop-shaped” and encompassing approximately 225 acres.77 It
observed that local residents had not reported salmon runs for “several
years” in Swift Creek, consistent with the Washington Department of
Fish and Wildlife’s conclusion that salmon could not utilize Swift Creek
“in its present state.” It was possible, the consultants pointed out, that
salmon in the Sumas River could also be affected by Swift Creek
sediment. The report stated that a “much more broad-based study of
sediment effects within the Sumas River” would be required to
determine the significance of Swift Creek.78
Not long after the report was released, EPA, in its first recorded
appearance in the Swift Creek saga, apparently came up with evidence of
Swift Creek’s impact on the Sumas River. In 1976, EPA reported
abnormally high levels of asbestos fibers in the Sumas River. The Water
Quality Division of Environment Canada became aware of these
findings, prompting water quality sampling and further research in the
late 1970s and early 1980s.79

74. CONVERSE DAVIS DIXON, supra note 69, at 12. See infra text accompanying note 231, for
a discussion of possible engineering solutions.
75. KERR WOOD LEIDAL, supra note 10, at 5-4; David L. Blake, Risk Analysis of Agricultural
Exposure to Airborne Asbestos in Whatcom County, Washington State 10 (May 1990) (unpublished
Master’s thesis, Western Washington University) (on file with Western Washington University
Library).
76. CONVERSE DAVIS DIXON, supra note 69, at 2.
77. Id. at 4 (observing that the landslide extended from an elevation of 1,000 feet up to an elevation of around 2,600 feet; the active portion was approximately 1,500 feet wide, 4,600 feet deep,
and 150 to 300 feet thick).
78. Id. at 10.
79. KERR WOOD LEIDAL, supra note 10, at 5-3. Since the time that this report was prepared,
laboratory tests have confirmed that chrysotile asbestos is hazardous to salmon. See generally Scott
E. Belanger et al., Effects of Chrysotile Asbestos on Coho Salmon and Green Sunfish: Evidence of
Behavioral and Pathological Stress, 39 ENVTL. RES. 74 (1986).
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At about the same time, Washington State’s environmental agency,
the Department of Ecology (Ecology), correlated Swift Creek sediment
with the presence of asbestos in Sumas River water samples. 80 Ecology
took water samples at several points along Whatcom County rivers in
November 1977. Both the samples from Swift Creek and from the Sumas
River downstream of its confluence with Swift Creek contained asbestos.
Samples from the Sumas River above Swift Creek, as well as samples
from another creek unaffected by the Sumas Mountain landslide, did not
contain asbestos.81 In a concise summation of the Swift Creek situation,
the memo concluded:
It appears that the local farmers and those persons most affected by
the slide debris and flooding will have to institute whatever action is
to be taken. Whether or not any of this would have an impact on the
asbestos fibre getting into the Sumas River is unknown. Assuming
the siltation could be controlled by sedimentation basins, etc.,
possibly the amount of fibre would be decreased but probably not
eliminated.82

C. The 1980s: Dredge, Haul, and Hope for the Best
Ecology’s observation that “those persons most affected” by Swift
Creek sediment would have to take care of the problem correctly
predicted a regime of local dredging and local disposal of dredged
sediments. Whatcom County began dredging the creek bed regularly
around 1980. The county left dredged sediments on the creek banks,
available as free fill to anyone who wanted to haul them away. Although
there is no record of where all of the dredged material went, it was
probably used in building sites and roadbeds throughout the county. This
80. Memorandum from Darrel Anderson to Dick Cunningham, Wash. Dep’t of Ecology,
Sumas River, Swift Creek Drainage Asbestos Fibre Source Investigation (Feb. 11, 1977), available
at http://www.ecy.wa.gov/pubs/77e00.pdf. A 1977 memorandum discussing the Converse Davis
Dixon geotechnical report states:
The presence of serpentinite [noted in the Converse Davis report] explains the source of
asbestos fibres [sic] in the water. Although there are various forms of serpentinite, the
basic structure shows fibreous [sic] structures and silky luster. This can be confirmed by
water samples taken at the Sumas River water monitoring station by D.O.E, downstream
from Sumas. Under the microscope the fibre [sic] structures can be seen on filter paper.
Since its presence can only be identified by the filtering method one can only guess as to
the amount of serpentinite entering the Sumas River drainage.
Id.
81. Samples were taken from Swift Creek, the Sumas River, and Breckinridge Creek. Breckinridge Creek, which is also a tributary of the Sumas River, is north of and roughly parallel to Swift
Creek. The Sumas Mountain landslide does not affect it. Memorandum from Shirley Prescott
to Dick Cunningham, Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, Asbestos Fibre Source Sumas River 3 (1977), available at http://www.ecy.wa.gov/pubs/77e23.pdf.
82. Id.
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approach to the dredged sediments was viewed simply as a win-win
situation: local residents and industries received free fill material in
return for clearing out piles of unwanted dredged sediments. Its legacy is
ongoing uncertainty about the location of Swift Creek sediments,
whether or not they are capable of becoming airborne, and the extent of
exposure to the sediments.
Although agencies knew that asbestos was present in sediments, the
record of the 1980s, to the extent that it has been pieced together, does
not indicate any efforts to address the extent to which Swift Creek
asbestos posed a health hazard. The dangers of asbestos in occupational
settings were well known. When the presence of asbestos in Swift Creek
sediments and Sumas River water was first established in the late 1970s,
asbestos litigation relating to occupational exposure was in full swing. In
1982, when the Johns Manville Corporation filed for bankruptcy
protection, it had been named in 17,000 asbestosis cases.83 In the absence
of acute health effects or of a regulatory regime that extended to asbestos
found outside the occupational setting, however, agency concern over
asbestos in Swift Creek and the Sumas River was slow to develop.
In the face of neglect, Swift Creek continued to create problems.
Despite Whatcom County’s dredging efforts, Swift Creek flooded
severely in 1983 and again in 1984. These floods again deposited thick
layers of asbestos-laden sediments on agricultural lands. Later in the
1980s, Dr. Hans Schreier, a researcher from Canada’s University of
British Columbia, published research demonstrating substantial asbestos
fiber concentrations in the Sumas River during the 1983–84 hydrological
cycle, showing that the Swift Creek landslide had influenced sediment
and water quality in at least a 9.9-mile reach of the Sumas River.84
In several further studies, Dr. Schreier and associates attempted to
analyze the presence of asbestos and related heavy metals in plants and
animals in Whatcom County. Fish samples from the Sumas River in
Washington and Canada showed elevated levels of nickel and
manganese, trace metals associated with asbestos fibers.85 The
documented presence of asbestos contributed to the slowly accumulating

83. Patrick M. Hanlon & Anne Smetak, Asbestos Changes, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 525,
540–41 (2007).
84. KERR WOOD LEIDAL, supra note 10, at 5-5.
85. H. Schreier, T.G. Northcote & K. Hall, Trace Metals in Fish Exposed to Asbestos Rich
Sediments, WATER, AIR, & SOIL POLLUTION 279, 290 (1987). A previous test had determined that,
under laboratory conditions, chrysotile asbestos is hazardous to salmon. Belanger, supra note 79; see
also James S. Webber & James R. Covey, Asbestos in Water, 21 CRITICAL REVS. ENVTL. CONTROL
331, 355–58 (1991) (reviewing studies evaluating the effect of asbestos on aquatic ecosystems,
including the Schreier and Belanger articles referenced in this note).
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body of information demonstrating that the river system was transporting
and distributing landslide sediments over long distances.
D. The 1990s: Asbestos Concerns Develop
By 1990, agencies began to show increasing uneasiness about the
presence of asbestos in Swift Creek sediments. The Port of Bellingham
considered using Swift Creek sediments for fill, but reconsidered after
the Northwest Washington Air Pollution Authority (now the Northwest
Washington Clean Air Agency) advised the port that the sediments
contained asbestos.86 To evaluate the presence of asbestos in Swift Creek
sediments, Whatcom County hired a consultant to collect and analyze
soil samples from Swift Creek’s streambed and bank. Eight samples
contained asbestos in concentrations between one and three percent. The
report summarized standards and advisories related to asbestos, noting
that no standards apply to NOA, and recommended safe-handling
procedures for using the sediments as fill.87
The following year, an employee of Northwest Air Pollution
Authority attempted to determine “the maximum health risk posed by the
[Swift Creek] deposits” by examining “what may be a worst-case human
exposure scenario—a farmer cultivating an asbestos sediment-containing
field.”88 The study focused on an eight-acre field characterized as “the
only contaminated field still under cultivation”89 after inundation by the
1975 flood. Asbestos-laden sediments therefore had been deposited
fifteen years prior to the study.90 The study concluded that there was no
evidence that regulatory standards had been violated. It also concluded
that the release of asbestos by wind erosion did not appear to pose a
significant threat in the study area.91 For more than fifteen years, this

86. KERR WOOD LEIDAL, supra note 10, at 5-6.
87. Id. at 5-7.
88. Blake, supra note 75, at 10.
89. Id. at 11.
90. Although the soil was poor because of the effects of the flood sediments, the farmer usually
planted a crop of corn or seed grass in May or June. An unusually wet spring during the study year,
1990, delayed cultivation, and the farmer ultimately “agreed to disturb the study area in a typical
manner (disc and tractor)” in September. As a result, conditions were dryer than they would have
been in spring, likely resulting in increased dust levels that were viewed as a worst-case scenario. Id.
91. Id. at 44. Ambient air samples were collected from five air samplers, and sampling filter
membrane cassettes were clipped to the farmer’s collar in an effort to determine impacts within his
breathing zone. Id. at 14. Chrysotile asbestos was identified in all samples collected from the sediment-laden field and in the sample from the breathing zone. The study concluded that neither the
ambient samples nor the farmer’s exposure met the Occupational Health and Safety Administration
“action level,” which required a time-weighted exposure of 0.2 fibers per cubic centimeter. Id. at 39.
When identifying asbestos fibers, the study only counted fibers greater than 0.5 micrometers in
length with an aspect ratio of at least five to one. Id. at 20, 42. As discussed further below, this is
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study constituted the best—indeed, the only—scientific examination of
the possible health risks of airborne asbestos from Swift Creek
sediments.
Most efforts continued to focus on removing the stream-blocking
sediments that continued to flow from the landslide.92 Whatcom County
hired a consulting firm to evaluate ways to reduce flooding by restricting
the amount of sediment that would accumulate in Swift Creek. The
County selected an option that would involve channel dredging,
construction of sediment traps, and relocating the confluence of the
North and South Forks of Swift Creek. It was estimated that the plan
would cost $600,000 to $1.6 million to implement, depending on the
marketability of the sediment as fill material.93 Whatcom County started
to implement the plan in 1998 by routinely dredging Swift Creek.94 It is
believed that most of the dredged sediment, estimated at 50,000 cubic
yards, was used as fill for the approaches to a new bridge.95
In Canada, the federal environmental agency, Environment Canada,
had been conducting a study of the Fraser River system, which includes
the Sumas River as a tributary. In 1998, Environment Canada released a
report showing that elevated levels of nickel, chromium, copper, and
zinc had been found in the sediments of the Sumas River system. It noted
that elevated levels of nickel and chromium, heavy metals often
associated with asbestos deposits, “likely” came from the Sumas
Mountain landslide.96
still the regulatory standard, although there is no scientific consensus that shorter asbestos fibers are
not potentially harmful to humans.
92. KERR WOOD LEIDAL, supra note 10, at 5-8 to -9. In 1995, Great Western Lumber, a private
company affected by flooding, proposed to remove gravel from Swift Creek. An ad hoc committee
of agency representatives found that samples from five plots were reported to contain only trace
amounts of chrysotile asbestos, below the one percent threshold in occupational settings. The gravel
removal apparently was allowed to proceed. On a broader scale, the Corps granted emergency authorization to Whatcom County to dredge Swift Creek with two conditions: Whatcom County
should pursue a long-term management plan, and the sediment could not be removed from the site.
Because it could no longer be removed, dredged sediment was added to berms along the side of the
Creek. In 1997, Whatcom County again needed to dredge sediment, in part because the sediments
that had been piled into berms along the side of Swift Creek were eroding back into the creek. The
Corps agreed to approve off-site disposal of the sediment, provided that clearance could be obtained
from the Whatcom County Health Department. After consulting with the Northwest Air Pollution
Authority, the Health Department replied that the material could be used as fill because it contained
less than one percent asbestos, and further stated that the asbestos-laden soil did not require a cover
or warning signs while in transport. Id.
93. Id. at 1-2.
94. Id. at 2-8.
95. Id. at 3-1.
96. MINISTRY OF WATER, LAND, AND AIR PROT., SUMMARY OF SURFACE WATER QUALITY
SAMPLING ON SUMAS RIVER AND TRIBUTARIES, ABBOTSFORD, BRITISH COLUMBIA 7–8 (2004),
available at http://www.env.gov.bc.ca/epd/regions/lower_mainland/water_quality/reports/
sumas_river/sumas_river.pdf.
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E. 2000 to 2005: Inklings of a Regulatory Regime
During the first few years of the twenty-first century, sedimentation
and flooding, not asbestos, remained the major concern relating to Swift
Creek. In a 2001 Whatcom County Council committee meeting, for
example, members of the County Council asked if Swift Creek was “the
creek that has something in the sediment that makes it difficult to get rid
of the sediment.” Whatcom County’s Public Works Director replied that
“Swift Creek has a form of asbestos that is not the type that has caused
lung problems, but it is still asbestos.” He further noted that the county
could not use all of the sediment for fill and that some of the dredged
sediment was piling up. “The trick is to find a user for it at the time it is
being excavated. Generally, no one is willing to use it if it costs to pile it
and then move it again.”97 At least at the local level, Swift Creek
continued to be viewed solely as a flood problem.
To reduce flooding, Whatcom County tried to obtain permits to
build a sediment trap on Swift Creek but found that it was working in a
new regulatory environment. The Washington Department of Fish and
Wildlife objected to the sediment-trap permits on the grounds that the
dredged, asbestos-laden sediments could reenter state surface waters.98
Although the Corps tried to create a work-around to allow dredging
while meeting the Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife’s
concerns, the sediment-trap project never went forward.99 This action
represented the start of a new era for Swift Creek with nonlocal agencies
concerned about the impacts of dredging the creek.
F. 2005 to the Present: Federal Agencies Come to Swift Creek
EPA again became involved in Swift Creek in 2005. To reduce the
constant risk of flooding, Whatcom County had applied to the Corps for
a permit to allow dredging and bank stabilization. EPA responded to the
Corps’ public notice of the permit application by requesting that the
Corps not issue a permit until public and environmental health concerns
were addressed.100

97. Minutes of the Whatcom Cnty. Council Pub. Works and Capital Projects Comm. 3
(Feb. 6, 2001), available at http://www.co.whatcom.wa.us/council/2001/minutes/Public_Works_for
_February_6.doc.
98. 2007 EPA SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 24, at 2-3.
99. Id.
100. EPA recommended that a method to monitor and track the use of dredged materials
should be developed, that there should be no minimum threshold for the requirement of permits for
the removal of materials, that the stockpiled material should be secured from unauthorized removal,
and that a public information project should be developed to inform potential users of the risks associated with NOA. Id. at 2-4.
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In response, Whatcom County notified the Corps that the
Washington State Department of Health would help the county assess the
health risks associated with the Swift Creek dredged material. The
county further pledged not to move dredged sediments away from the
banks of Swift Creek until the health risks were determined. This
cautionary approach was memorialized in the Corps’ permit, which
required Whatcom County to “securely store” all dredged sediments “at
the project site on adjacent uplands” and prohibited the removal of the
dredged sediments “for any use including as fill material.”101 Whatcom
County could no longer pile sediments on the creek banks and allow
residents and construction companies to haul the sediments away as free
fill material. Instead, the sediments had to be stored on private property
on the banks of Swift Creek.
With this permit in hand, Whatcom County launched the “Big Dig”
in the summer of 2005. It dredged approximately 85,000 cubic yards
from one reach of Swift Creek, stockpiling all of the material along the
creek’s banks. The stockpiled materials formed high levees which, it was
believed at the time would be a temporary storage solution until a better
solution could be developed. In an attempt to prevent further exposure,
fences, gates, and warning signs were installed along several access
points, although these measures have not stopped people from walking
and even riding off-road recreational vehicles through creek sediments
and on top of the levees.102 “Securing” the sediments in large creek-side
berms may have actually attracted recreational use, which has the
potential to expose more residents to asbestos-laden dust. The agencies
themselves were not sure how much risk the sediments posed, and
throughout 2005 made further efforts to analyze the extent of asbestos in
the soils and the risk of exposure to airborne asbestos.103 Federal, state,
and county health officials, including ATSDR, the Washington
Department of Health, and the Whatcom County Health Department,
101. Id. at 2-4.
102. HEALTH CONSULTATION, supra note 12, at 5.
103. Id. at 8. The Whatcom County Health Department took sediment samples from Swift
Creek in June 2005 and found that fine-grained sediments contained as much as forty-six percent
chrysotile asbestos, as well as trace levels of amphibole fibers. Id. Western Washington University,
in nearby Bellingham, Washington, conducted independent analysis of samples from Swift Creek’s
banks and streambed. The asbestos concentration was not noted, but chrysotile asbestos fibers were
observed. Id. During dredging in August 2005, Whatcom County and the Washington State Department of Labor and Industries took personal air samples from workers’ breathing zones for roughly
three to five hours over the course of two days. Asbestos fibers were detected in twelve of the sixteen samples, but most samples had concentrations below analytical reporting levels, and all samples
were below the permissible exposure limit. It was noted, however, that these results were influenced
by the analytical method used, which was unable to detect the small asbestos fibers characteristic of
Swift Creek sediments.
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conducted a site visit in August 2005. They walked past a gate with signs
prohibiting the removal of sediments and then climbed to the top of the
levees that contained stockpiled sediments from the previous dredging.
Dredging was still occurring at the time, and the health officials observed
that “[n]umerous pieces of heavy equipment were removing sediment
from the creek and placing it on the bank or moving it around on the
levees,”104 as a water tanker truck sprayed water on the levee soils to
minimize dust. Researchers observed off-road recreational vehicle tracks
running through Swift Creek sediments and photographed a child’s bigwheel toy sitting adjacent to a levee.105
The resultant health consultation report, issued in March 2006,
identified numerous potential airborne exposure pathways for asbestos,
including windblown dust from piles, off-road recreational vehicles
stirring up dust in Swift Creek or on levees, dust in yards where
sediments were used as fill, tilling or working earth where sediments had
been deposited, and dredging for flood control.106 The report further
observed, “downstream exposures to asbestos are possible if there is
significant deposition along Sumas River.” Although Dr. Schreier’s
publications from the 1980s were not cited, the health consultation report
did note the possibility of impacts on the Sumas and Fraser Rivers in
Canada.107
The health consultation report concluded that the health risk from
asbestos was “indeterminate.” In particular, it found that “[c]urrent
knowledge of asbestos content and physical properties in Swift Creek
sediments is insufficient for determining human health risks and
appropriate end use of dredged sediments” and recommended that the
asbestos in Swift Creek should be fully characterized.108 The report’s
primary recommendation encouraged the agencies to develop a
collaborative sampling plan so as to fully characterize of the asbestos in
the sediments. With that recommendation in hand, Whatcom County’s
Health Department asked EPA to characterize the asbestos by defining
the type and concentrations of asbestos.109
Starting in April of 2006, EPA performed four phases of
investigation: site reconnaissance, integrated assessment, activity-based

104. Id. at 6.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 13.
107. Id. at 12 ( “[The Department of Health] has no information on whether Sumas River is
used as a source of drinking water in British Columbia, or what the impacts are on Fraser River’s
water quality.”)
108. Id. at 4.
109. 2007 EPA SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 24, at 2-5.
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sampling and analysis, and risk evaluation.110 During the site
reconnaissance, conducted in April 2006, EPA collected sediment and
water samples. Polarized light microscopy detected chrysotile asbestos in
all eight samples. The concentration of asbestos ranged from trace
amounts to approximately thirty percent.
The integrated assessment, conducted in May, was a site
investigation that assessed the necessity for clean-up at the site.111 EPA
assessed soil and air filter samples from the levee of dredged material
piles on the south side of Swift Creek. Asbestos levels in those soil
samples ranged from trace amounts to 4.4%. Those soil samples also
showed elevated levels of three heavy metals: chromium, nickel, and
vanadium. The air samples included stationary samples and personal
samples. Personal air sampling involves placing an air-sampling pump
on a worker with the air inlet placed near the person’s breathing zone.112
While asbestos was found in all of the air samples, the average
concentration for the personal samples was more than ten times greater
than the average concentration of the stationary samples.113
Based on the integrated assessment, EPA concluded “the dredged
material piles at the site were contaminated with asbestos and metals and
that people working or traveling across the site are potentially exposed to
these contaminants.” EPA further concluded “asbestos could be
migrating to off-site locations, including nearby residential areas.”114
The third phase of EPA’s investigation, activity-based sampling,
was intended to simulate exposures to asbestos that could result from
common activities at the site. EPA workers, dressed in moon suits with
respirators containing filters designed to collect asbestos fibers,
performed activities described as “loading/hauling, raking/spreading, and
recreation (walking/jogging/biking).” All of the samples from the
workers’ air filters contained asbestos.115
Activity-based sampling was an important input into the final stage
of EPA’s 2006 investigation, the risk assessment. EPA concluded that
for all evaluated activities the excess lifetime cancer risk from asbestos
was greater than one in one million (1 x 10-6), and the risk was greater
than one in ten thousand (1 x 10-4) for some activities.116 These risk
levels correspond to threshold determinations for further agency action.
110. Id. at 2-5, 4-1.
111. The assessment was “integrated” because it applied both criteria for a time-critical removal action and the criteria for listing on the National Priorities List. Id. at 5-1.
112. Id. at 6-1.
113. Id. at 5-1 to -2.
114. Id. at 5-2.
115. Id. at 6-3.
116. Id. at 7-2.
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EPA noted that, under the Superfund program, a risk level below one in
one million is considered de minimis, while a risk level greater than one
in ten thousand may form the basis for a cleanup action.117
The risk assessment resulted in the conclusion that “[r]esidents
living near the Swift Creek Asbestos Site should limit exposure to Swift
Creek dredged materials,” and that contact with off-site materials could
also lead to indeterminate exposure risks.118 EPA further recommended
that “dredged materials no longer be removed from the site without
personal protection and that it not be taken to other sites where further
exposure is possible, as has been done in the past.”119 EPA concluded
that a successful response to Swift Creek asbestos would have to be
collaborative, involving many agencies
In response to this risk assessment, EPA used its removal authority
under CERCLA to “reduce the potential for an uncontrolled release of
asbestos from the dredged materials presently stockpiled along Swift
Creek . . . .”120 EPA used its removal authority in November of 2007 to
re-grade the site and apply a dust suppressing “tackifier” compound to
the dredged sediment piles in order to limit wind dispersal of asbestos
fibers.
The Washington Department of Health and ATSDR also responded
to the risk assessment by preparing a health consultation that focused on
health statistics and public health issues.121 The 2008 report reviewed
existing health statistics, comparing the number of cancer cases
identified in the community near Swift Creek with the number of cancer
cases seen in two reference populations. The report concluded that “[i]n
the area of interest, no mesothelioma cases were identified from 1992 to
2004. Lung and bronchus cancer rates were in the area of interest, were
similar to Washington State rates, and were not significantly different
from Whatcom County as a whole.”122 Although the small number of
117. Id. at 7-1. The Washington State Department of Ecology generally uses a maximum level
of risk of one in one million for residential exposures and one in one hundred thousand for industrial
exposures. Id.
118. Id. at 8-1.
119. Id.
120. JAMES PETERSON, ECOLOGY & ENVTL., INC., SWIFT CREEK ASBESTOS SITE: TIME
CRITICAL REMOVAL ACTION REPORT EVERSON, WASHINGTON 2-3 (2008), available at http://yose
mite.epa.gov/r10/CLEANUP.NSF/sites/sumasmtndocs/$FILE/Swift+CK+Removal+Rpt+Final_Apr
2008.pdf. See infra text accompanying note 151, for a discussion of the basis and extent of EPA’s
removal authority under CERCLA.
121. WASH. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EVALUATION OF HEALTH STATISTICS AND PUBLIC HEALTH
DATA GAPS RELATED TO EXPOSURE TO NATURALLY OCCURRING ASBESTOS FROM SWIFT CREEK
(Feb. 22, 2008) [hereinafter PUBLIC HEALTH EVALUATION], available at http://www.doh.wa.gov/eh
p/oehas/pubs/swiftcreekasbestos08.pdf (prepared under a cooperative agreement with ATSDR).
122. Id. at 10.
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cases resulted in “wide confidence intervals around calculated values,”
the lack of an observed increase in the number of cancer cases led to a
recommendation not to conduct further epidemiological analyses.123
The health consultation report also focused on data gaps. Observing
that EPA’s sampling and analysis had provided “much-needed
information,” the report noted that, “[u]nfortunately, it is difficult to
extrapolate results of activity based sampling to other scenarios,
including indoor exposure. Consequently, it is difficult to determine
what public health actions are appropriate without a more complete
picture of potential exposures.”124 Because of these data gaps, the report
concluded that Swift Creek asbestos presents an “indeterminate” public
health hazard.125
In addition, the health consultation report notes that data gaps exist
in areas relating to both occupational and non-occupational exposure.
Occupational exposure could occur from a number of activities and
locations: future creek dredging; stream restoration efforts (which were
halted once asbestos was identified); road repairs where Swift Creek
sediments had been used as fill or bed material; and at Great Western
Lumber, a local sawmill that may have used Swift Creek sediment in its
lumber yard.126
Non-occupational exposure primarily originates from dust blown
into or tracked into homes. This exposure is not limited to homes near
Swift Creek; as the health consultation report notes, people have used
Swift Creek sediments as fill throughout Whatcom County:
The full extent to which asbestos-containing sediments have been
used off-site is uncertain, and will likely never be completely
known, but an estimated 2 million cubic yards were moved off-site.
Anecdotal information suggests that Swift Creek sediments have
been used as fill for a variety of private (e.g., driveways, parking
lots, log yards, and horse arenas) and public projects (e.g.,
transportation projects). A potential pathway of significant concern
is the in home exposure pathway. If asbestos containing fill was
used at or near residential properties, there is potential that asbestos
may have been tracked into the home over time. Since people spend
the majority of time indoors, this potentially presents a frequent and
prolonged exposure pathway.127

123. Id. at 24.
124. Id. at 11.
125. Id. at 13.
126. Id. at 11–12.
127. Id. at 11.
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Flooding and the possible dispersion of asbestos sediments beyond
Swift Creek also presented an uncertainty, or data gap, with regard to
downstream exposure. The health consultation report observed that
because Swift Creek flows into the Sumas River, flooding of the Sumas
River could also deposit asbestos into the floodplain, homes, and
basements of the Sumas River basin.128
That uncertainty did not last long. Nature soon provided scientists
with the opportunity to fill this “data gap” when heavy winter rains
caused the Sumas River to flood in the first days of 2009. EPA’s
subsequent sampling in May 2009 yielded sobering results. Chrysotile
asbestos and some actinolite asbestos were detected in upland soil and
bank sediment samples collected from Swift Creek and from the Sumas
River downstream from Swift Creek. Chrysotile asbestos was detected in
surface water samples. The concentrations detected were much higher
than those detected in earlier sampling efforts, which focused on dredged
sediments. Concentrations as high as 27% in upland soil samples and up
to 22.75% in bank sediment samples collected along the Sumas River
downstream from Swift Creek. Surface water samples detected up to 879
million asbestos fibers per liter in the Sumas River downstream from
Swift Creek.129 Disturbingly, the level of asbestos in the soils did not
appear to diminish significantly as the Sumas River flowed north to the
Canadian borders. Sampling indicated that upland soils at a site just
south of the border contained 26.75% asbestos.130
In response to the potential, but still “indeterminate,” risk of
exposure to asbestos created by the flood conditions, EPA proposed a
number of measures that property owners along the Sumas River should
take. These measures included removing shoes before entering a house,
dusting with a wet cloth rather than a feather duster or dry cloth, and
keeping out of areas where asbestos may be present. Additionally, EPA
provided specific advice for pets: “If they do get dirty, bathe the pet
(brushing can release fibers into the air).”131
For farmers, homeowners, and businesses to take such inconvenient
precautionary measures, they would need to believe both that asbestos in
the soils created a health risk and that taking off their shoes and washing
their pets would have a material effect on the health risks that they face.
128. Id.
129. OFFICE OF ENVTL. ASSESSMENT, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REGION 10, SOIL,
SEDIMENT AND SURFACE WATER SAMPLING, SUMAS MOUNTAIN NATURALLY-OCCURRING
ASBESTOS SITE, WHATCOM COUNTY, WASHINGTON 7 (Oct. 13, 2009), available at http://yosemite.
epa.gov/R10/CLEANUP.NSF/6ea33b02338c3a5e882567ca005d382f/8b0d044466ea186b882572a60
06cc71b/$FILE/20091013_finalreport.pdf.
130. Id. at 16.
131. Id. at 8.
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Because of the uncertainty surrounding asbestos from Swift Creek, many
local people doubt those propositions.
G. Risks from Sumas Mountain/Swift Creek Asbestos
To date, health agencies have concluded that (1) a “public health
hazard” exists for people conducting activities regularly on dredge piles;
(2) an “unacceptable cancer risk” of greater than one in ten thousand, or
one excess cancer in ten thousand exposed people, results from some
activities; (3) risk factors may be “underestimated” because exposures
may occur at other locations, such as indoor environments of residences
near Swift Creek; (4) there is no evidence of elevated rates of asbestos
related disease such as mesothelioma and lung cancer in the community
near Swift Creek compared to Whatcom County or Washington State as
a whole; and, (5) nonetheless, an “indeterminate public health hazard”
exists for people who may be exposed to Swift Creek asbestos off-site,
such as indoor locations or areas where dredged material was used as
fill.132
While the agencies’ caution and lack of certainty are defensible
from a legal and scientific perspective, it is very difficult for the general
public to understand the ramifications of such vague and seemingly
conflicting conclusions. Nor is it apparent to citizens why the agencies
that “caused” the problem by proclaiming that the area is risky can
neither solve the problems created by Swift Creek asbestos nor explain
clearly what needs to be done to solve the problem.
In November 2007, multiple agencies hosted a public information
session to discuss EPA’s risk assessment with local citizens.
Representatives from nine federal, state, and local agencies, including
ATSDR, EPA, the Corps, the Washington State Departments of Ecology,
Health, and Natural Resources, the Northwest Clear Air Agency, and
Whatcom County Departments of Public Works and Health met in a
community center near Swift Creek. The Administrator of EPA Region
10 participated, as did the Seattle District commander for the Corps.
The first speaker, the owner of a lumber company who had
periodically dredged the areas of Swift Creek that ran through his
property, questioned the significance of the risk assessment:
[O]ne [value] that ended up outside of the range of reasonable risk
was the child play and that was two hours a day for a full year, 350
days a year for 10 years. I mean, that's just not a—I mean, that
doesn't seem realistic to me and that one, like I said, was again was
from a maximum value, not a mean value. So it just seems like
132. HEALTH CONSULTATION, supra note 12, at 13.
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we're taking—the information we're basing these decisions on are
really from an extreme and I just can't get my head around this, how
we can make these decisions that are affecting this community
based on—it seems like kind of iffy numbers . . . .133

EPA personnel responded that the analysis was inherently
uncertain, but that they were concerned about potential health effects.
The following exchange epitomizes the difficulties of the Swift Creek
situation, where agencies cannot state clearly that the situation is
dangerous but also cannot assure the public that the situation is safe
MS. LORI COHEN:

Can I just add to that? The one other thing I did
want to say is you are asking for like kind of a bright line as to
what's safe or not safe and I don't think we quite addressed that.
There really is no bright line. Asbestos is a human carcinogen and
there's no amount that's truly safe and so you do have to make these
sort of assessments and evaluations to judge what kind of exposures
you might be—what kind of exposures might be there and what the
potential increased risk of cancer is to an individual. So I don't think
we could ever say there is an absolute bright line of what is safe.
MR. TOM WESTERGREEN: You still have to make a decision. You
can say that about everything in life, that there's risk in everything
you do, and that's what the frustration here is, Lori, is coming up
with that level . . . .134

The absence of a bright line permeates the range of regulatory
responses available to NOA in general, and to Swift Creek in particular.
“Business as usual” is not possible because of the risk, but the risk is not
so clearly elevated that significant resources are available for a response.
IV. “A SEAM BETWEEN THE AUTHORITIES”: REGULATORY AUTHORITY
MR. CHUCK GELWICKS: I want to know who is going to take
responsibility when it's a foot thick on our land. That's what I want to
know.
MR. MIKE MCCORMICK:

If we are called for the flood fight we will work
with you on that, on the flood fight, but the impact to the land and
everything else, I think that's really what you're getting to, the
detrimental impacts to your farmland.

MR. CHUCK GELWICKS:

Yes.

MR. MIKE MCCORMICK:

That's what you're talking about?

133. Nov. 2007 Transcript, supra note 1, at 9–10.
134. Id. at 13–14.
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MR. CHUCK GELWICKS:

Everybody's, yes.

MR. MIKE MCCORMICK:

I think that's beyond my authority.

MR. CHUCK GELWICKS:

Well, whose authority would it be?

MR. MIKE MCCORMICK:

I don't know, sir.
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—Swift Creek Meeting at Glen Echo Community Club.135

The regulation of asbestos can best be described as erratic. It is a
hazardous waste for purposes of some laws but not for others.
Commercial asbestos is extensively regulated at the federal level, but this
authority does not always apply to NOA. Federal, state, and local
governments all have some type of authority that they may be able to use
to address NOA, but the extent to which agencies must act to address
NOA concerns is less clear. As the Corps District Commander observed
at a public meeting in 2007, “where we are right now is a seam between
the authorities. And that’s not an answer you want to hear, but to the
extent I understand it, it’s probably the reality.”136 Although a seam
between the authorities is an uncomfortable location, it does dictate
cooperation and may lead to creativity. Whether any or all of these
authorities will be able to address NOA at Swift Creek, or whether NOA
will turn out to be a problem without a regulatory solution, is the subject
of Part V. First, however, the following sections describe existing
regulatory authority.
A. Hazardous Waste Regulation
1. CERCLA: Release, Liability, and Removal
Asbestos is classified as a hazardous substance under CERCLA.137
CERCLA focuses primarily on liability and contains only one regulatory

135. Id. at 62–63.
136. Id. at 35 (quoting Mike McCormick, Seattle District Commander, U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers).
137. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14)(E) (2006) (referencing hazardous air pollutants listed under 42
U.S.C. § 7412(b)); 40 C.F.R. § 302.4 (2011) (asbestos on list of hazardous substances); see also
United States v. W.R. Grace & Co., 280 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1153 (2003) (where parties stipulated that
asbestos is a hazardous substance under CERCLA). In the context of a discussion of CERCLA liability, EPA representatives told local governments in Whatcom County that asbestos is “not a hazardous waste.” See Minutes of the Whatcom Cnty. Council Special Surface Water Work Session,
supra note 2, at 3 (“So far, asbestos is not designated as a hazardous waste. . . . For now, they are
just saying that this is not a hazardous waste.”). While asbestos is not defined as a hazardous waste
under CERCLA, its designation as a hazardous substance makes asbestos subject to CERCLA’s
reporting and liability requirements. See infra, text accompanying notes 138–41. The speaker at the
Whatcom County Council Special Surface Water Work Session may have been thinking about the
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provision, which requires any person in charge of a facility to report any
release of hazardous substances from the facility.138 “Facility” includes
“any site or area where a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored,
disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located,”139 and “release”
means “any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying,
discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the
environment.”140 The reporting requirement for asbestos is triggered
upon release of one pound of friable asbestos.141
CERCLA’s reporting requirements technically are broad enough to
require reporting by landowners (“in charge” of a “facility”) when
sufficient asbestos is “released” (removed by floods or wind) from a pile
of dredged materials in which asbestos has been disposed of142 or stored.
It could theoretically require Whatcom County or other agency
employees to report releases when dredging or otherwise moving
asbestos-laden soils. This would, of course, require continuous
monitoring and measurement.
In addition to the reporting requirements, CERCLA establishes
liability for owners and operators of facilities, as well as arrangers (any
person who arranged for disposal or transport) and transporters of
hazardous substances.143 Liability accrues for the release of a hazardous
substance144 and can extend to the costs of any removal or remedial
actions taken by the federal or state government, any other necessary
response costs, and damages to natural resources.145

fact that asbestos is not regulated as a hazardous waste under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).
138. 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a) (2010).
139. Id. § 9601(9).
140. Id. § 9601(12).
141. 40 C.F.R. § 302.4 (2011); Memorandum from Michael S. Alushin & Glenn L. Unterberger, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, to Regional Counsels, Regions I–X, Inclusion of CERCLA Section 103(a) Counts in Asbestos NESHAP Cases (1990), available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance
/resources/policies/civil/caa/stationary/inclu-asbes-rpt.pdf (“Even though CERCLA regulations do
not define the term ‘friable asbestos,’ the reportable quantity should not be interpreted to include one
pound of ‘any material containing more than 1 percent asbestos by weight that hand pressure can
crumble . . . .’ 40 C.F.R. § 61.141 (definition of friable asbestos under Clean Air Act).”).
142. Under the Solid Waste Disposal Act, “disposal” encompasses any “discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any solid waste or hazardous waste into or on any
land or water so that such [waste] or any constituent thereof may enter the environment or be emitted into the air or discharged into any waters, including ground waters.” 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3). This
definition from the Solid Waste Disposal Act is applied to CERCLA through 42 U.S.C. § 9601(29).
143. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2010).
144. Id.
145. Id. § 9607(a)(4)(d).
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These definitions require human action: asbestos must be disposed
of or transported, or its disposal or transport must be arranged.146
Asbestos that merely washes up along the banks of a river system likely
would not fall within this definition,147 but asbestos that has been
dredged, hauled, or stored on the bank of a stream probably would
qualify if it were released into the environment.
For decades, Whatcom County residents, companies, and
government agencies have transported asbestos-laden sediments and
used those sediments for purposes that have not been documented but
that likely include the construction of roads, parking lots, and trails. It
has been estimated that two million cubic yards of sediment have been
dredged and removed from Swift Creek.148 Beginning in the late 1940s,
the Corps was responsible for dredging Swift Creek as a flood control
measure. Later, the Whatcom County Public Works River and Flood
Division assumed the responsibility of dredging and maintaining Swift
Creek.149 Further, private property owners, in the interest of preventing
flooding, allowed the storage of sediments on their land. In theory, any
of these potentially responsible parties could be liable under Superfund.
To date, this expansive web of potential Superfund liability has
made the entire issue of liability recede into the background. In a
situation in which almost every entity lives in a glass house, the decision
to throw a stone is fraught with difficulty. When EPA discussed liability
with the Whatcom County Council, EPA warned the council that “there
is liability associated with Superfund” and that it could affect private
property owners. The concluding message, however, was that
“Superfund isn’t interested unless there is a specific risk.”150
146. “Transport” means “the movement of a hazardous substance by any mode.” Id. §
9601(26).
147. A recent federal district court case could cause uncertainty about this conclusion, to the
extent that any asbestos transported by the river could be shown to have originated on the dredge
piles. The court found that the Washington Department of Transportation was liable under CERCLA
as an “arranger” because it designed a storm water drainage system that deposited roadway contaminants in the environment. United States v. Wash. Dep’t of Transp., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1015
(W.D. Wash. 2010). If a reviewing court found that the criteria of the case were met—that an entity
designed, constructed and operated the dredge piles, that their sole function was related to the collection and disposal of hazardous runoff, that the arranger knew that the system contained hazardous
substances, and that there was an actual release of a hazardous substance—it is possible that arranger liability could apply.
148. PUBLIC HEALTH EVALUATION, supra note 121, at 11.
149. HEALTH CONSULTATION, supra note 12, at 5.
150. Minutes of the Whatcom Cnty. Council Pub. Works and Capital Projects Comm., supra
note 97, at 7. CERCLA establishes an “act of God” defense, which applies when a release of a hazardous substance “and the damages resulting therefrom were caused solely by” an act of God. 42
U.S.C. § 9607(b) (2010). An act of God is defined as “an unanticipated grave natural disaster or
other natural phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable, and irresistible character, the effects of
which could not have been prevented or avoided by the exercise of due care or foresight.” Id. §
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Neither the liability provisions of CERCLA nor the releasereporting obligation appear likely to result in the kind of long-term
solution to the Swift Creek asbestos problem sought by agencies and
residents. CERCLA also provides EPA with more promising tools by
granting it authority under two distinct cleanup classifications: removal
actions and remedial actions. EPA is authorized to initiate removal or
remedial actions at sites where the release or substantial threat of release
of a pollutant may pose an imminent and substantial danger to public
health and welfare.151 Removal or remedial activities are not authorized
in response to a release, or threat of release, of “a naturally occurring
substance in its unaltered form, or altered solely through naturally
occurring processes or phenomena, from a location where it is naturally
found.”152 This limitation should not apply to Swift Creek asbestos that
has been dredged or moved, because it is not in a location “where it is
naturally found.”
EPA’s removal authority over NOA that has been altered or
transported by human activities is supported by a number of federal
district court cases. In cases involving Libby, Montana vermiculite mine
that exposed workers and residents to high levels of asbestos, the
responsible party strenuously contested EPA’s removal activities on the
grounds that the asbestos was a naturally occurring substance. The
federal district court considered the fact that rain washed material from
the mine into a nearby river, and concluded that “[a]ny asbestos that
washed off disturbed areas at the Mine Site to the Kootenai River was
not in its ‘unaltered form, or altered solely by naturally occurring
processes or phenomena.’ ”153
In a similar case, a mining company contended that arsenic, a
naturally occurring element found around a mine, was exempt from
regulation under CERCLA. The court held, however, that “the arsenic is
not found in its unaltered form because mining, an unnatural process, has
9607(b)(1). Under the act of God defense, a potentially responsible party would likely contend that
the Swift Creek landslide constitutes an unanticipated natural disaster, however slow-moving and
permanent it may be. The potentially responsible party would further need to establish that the damages resulting from the natural disaster were caused solely by the natural disaster. The agencies that
conducted that dredging might be able to contend that the damage could not have been prevented or
avoided by the exercise of due care and that their actions constituted due care and foresight to prevent greater damage. However, this approach might not be available to the private parties who transported or received sediment, unless they could convincingly argue that no due care or foresight
could have prevented damage because the nature of the materials were unknown. In light of the strict
liability nature of CERCLA, this would be a departure from the law’s current interpretation.
151. Id. § 9604(b).
152. Id. § 9604(a)(3)(A).
153. United States v. W.R. Grace & Co., 280 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1155 (2003); see also id. at
1148.
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altered its location.”154 In another mining case, a court found that acid
mine drainage was not a naturally occurring release, even though it
consisted of naturally occurring substances, because “mining constitutes
an artificial alteration rather than a naturally occurring process or
phenomenon.”155 A court has also summarily rejected the application of
the exception to “naturally occurring” metals in soil, noting that the
metals were located in fill material brought onto the site from another
location. The court held that they were not in the location where they
would be “naturally found.”156 These cases, which view the movement of
soils as sufficient alteration to avoid the exclusion, support EPA’s
response authority over sediments that have been exposed through
dredging or relocated to sites in which they did not naturally occur.
EPA’s response authority over sediments distributed through
flooding is a more open question. CERCLA would only exempt NOA
“in its unaltered form . . . from a location where it is naturally found”
from EPA’s response authority. NOA is not “naturally found” in
basements or municipal storm drains, where it appears after flooding.
Although a natural process delivered the asbestos, the portion the
CERCLA statute that refers to natural processes addresses the alteration
of asbestos not its transportation or location (“altered solely through
naturally occurring processes or phenomena”). Thus, if EPA chose to
exercise its response authority over flood-distributed asbestos, the
exceptions in CERCLA should not prevent it from doing so.157
If it is accepted that EPA has response authority over at least some
of the asbestos from Swift Creek sediments, the next question is the
scope and nature of the actions that it is authorized to take. CERCLA
defines a remedial action as permanent, whereas removal actions are
defined as actions consistent with future remedial actions or actions that
are taken under emergency authority. Remedial actions can only be
initiated once a site has been listed on the National Priorities List (NPL),
which is an inventory of hazardous waste sites that meet specific criteria
based on their individual Hazard Ranking System (HRS) scores. Swift
Creek has not been listed on the NPL, and it is not known whether the
asbestos contamination present at Swift Creek would generate a HRS
score sufficient to list the site on the NPL.158 The uncertain health threat
154. Monarch Greenback v. Monticello Ins. Co., 118 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1080 (D. Idaho 1999).
155. United States v. Iron Mountain Mines, 812 F. Supp. 1528, 1548 (1992).
156. Containerport Grp. v. Am. Fin. Grp., 128 F. Supp. 2d 470, 482 n.16 (2001).
157. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(3)(A) (2010).
158. A site can be listed on the NPL if it meets one of the following three criteria:
(1) The release scores sufficiently high pursuant to the Hazard Ranking System . . . .
(2) A state . . . has designated a release as its highest priority. States may make only one
such designation; or

2012] The Emerging Legal Problem of Naturally Occurring Asbestos 161
posed by NOA makes a risk determination difficult, and local politicians
and EPA officials do not appear interested in pursuing an NPL listing.159
Further, personnel involved in the Swift Creek issue may have believed,
incorrectly, that CERCLA’s liability provisions would not apply if Swift
Creek was not included on the NPL.160
Unlike remedial actions, removal actions can occur on sites not
scored using the HRS or listed on the NPL.161 Although CERCLA does
not define “removal action,” the statute does define “remove” and
“removal”:
The terms “remove” or “removal” means the cleanup or removal of
released hazardous substances from the environment, such actions
as may be necessary taken in the event of the threat of release of
hazardous substances into the environment, such actions as may be
necessary to monitor, assess, and evaluate the release or threat of
release of hazardous substances, the disposal of removed material,
or the taking of such other actions as may be necessary to prevent,
minimize, or mitigate damage to the public health or welfare or to
the environment, which may otherwise result from a release or
threat of release. The term includes, in addition, without being
limited to, security fencing or other measures to limit access,
provision of alternative water supplies, [and] temporary evacuation
and housing of threatened individuals not otherwise provided for.162

The National Contingency Plan (NCP), which consists of the
regulations that govern the selection and implementation of removal and
remedial actions,163 states that removal actions must “be terminated after
$2 million has been obligated for the action or 12 months have elapsed
from the date removal activities begin on site.”164
(3) The release satisfies all of the following criteria:
(i) The Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry has issued a health advisory that recommends dissociation of individuals from the release;
(ii) EPA determines that the release poses a significant threat to public health; and
(iii) EPA anticipates that it will be more cost-effective to use its remedial authority
than to use removal authority to respond to the release.
40 C.F.R. § 300.425(c) (2010).
159. Interview by Douglas Naftz with Luke Loeffler, Congressional Aide, Representative Rick
Larsen (Feb. 2009).
160. Id.
161. 40 C.F.R. § 300.425(b)(1) (2010).
162. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (2010).
163. The full title of the NCP is the “National Oil and Hazardous Substance Pollution Contingency Plan.” Id. § 9605(a). The NCP is located at 40 C.F.R. § 300. For the government to recover
costs, its removal and remedial activities must be “not inconsistent with” the NCP. 42 U.S.C. §
9607(a)(4)(A). For private parties to recover costs, their activities must be “consistent” with the
NCP. Id. § 9607(a)(4)(B).
164. 40 C.F.R. 300.415(b)(5) (2010).
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In November 2007, EPA approved a Time Critical Removal Action
(TCRA) at Swift Creek. EPA intended the removal action to “reduce the
potential for an uncontrolled release of asbestos” through the application
of a dust suppressant, or tackifier, to the sediment piles. EPA also regraded the stockpiles in an effort to prevent erosion.165 It appears,
however, that these stopgap measures may not have worked as intended.
Premature failure of the tackifier has been observed along the sediment
piles, and erosion of the sediment pilings continues, especially during
periods of high creek flow.166 These stopgap measures alone may not
adequately protect public health and welfare of the surrounding
community.
The NCP arguably only requires EPA to abate, minimize, stabilize,
or mitigate the threat to public health that resulted in the removal
action.167 The goal of EPA’s removal authority, however, is to prevent
“imminent and substantial danger to public health and welfare.”168 This
language implies that the removal action should ensure that this
“substantial danger” no longer exists. Although EPA certainly intended
its actions to minimize asbestos exposure pathways, many such exposure
pathways remain. Recent observations suggest that the 2007 removal
action did not adequately address the exposure pathways originally
targeted in the removal action. It appears likely that the public health risk
that led to the removal action will simply recur—as many times as
EPA’s short-term measures fail or wear out.
The twelve-month limit on removal activities, if measured from the
November 2007 action, has expired. An emergency exemption would
nonetheless allow future removal action to occur. The emergency
exemption is authorized when “[t]here is an immediate risk to public
health or welfare of the United States or the environment; continued
response actions are immediately required to prevent, limit, or mitigate
an emergency; and such assistance will not otherwise be provided on a
timely basis.”169 This exemption was applied to EPA’s removal activities
in Libby, Montana. Although Swift Creek does not involve the dramatic
public health risk present in Libby, it does present a large-scale, longterm asbestos problem in a populated area, “not a remote, abandoned

165. JAMES PETERSEN, ECOLOGY& ENV’T, INC., SWIFT CREEK ASBESTOS SITE TIME-CRITICAL
REMOVAL ACTION REPORT, EVERSON, WASHINGTON 2-3, 3-2 (2008), available at http://yosemite.e
pa.gov/r10/CLEANUP.NSF/sites/sumasmtndocs/$FILE/Swift+CK+Removal+Rpt+Final_Apr2008.p
df.
166. Interview by Douglas Naftz with Luke Loeffler, supra note 159.
167. 40 C.F.R. § 300.415(b)(3).
168. Id. § 307.22(e)(2) (2011).
169. Id. § 300.415(b)(5)(i).
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mine”170 as the Ninth Circuit emphasized when it upheld EPA’s
activities in Libby. Furthermore, as in Libby, “assistance from other
government agencies [is] not anticipated on a timely basis.”171
The Ninth Circuit has noted that “[t]he term ‘emergency’ is not
defined in CERCLA or the National Contingency Plan, and EPA has
interpreted it to include a range of time-sensitive threats.”172 Although
the term “emergency” has never been used by EPA with regard to the
situation at Swift Creek, the request for the 2007 removal action at Swift
Creek stated that “[a]ctual or threatened releases of hazardous substances
from this site, if not addressed by implementing the response action
selected in this action memorandum, may present an imminent and
substantial endangerment to public health, or welfare or the
environment.”173 This description is consistent with an emergency.
The selection of a time-critical removal action by EPA in 2007 may
support the determination of an emergency at Swift Creek when flooding
occurs. With a projected 400 to 600 years of sediment release from the
Sumas Mountain landslide,174 Swift Creek likely will continue to deposit
hazardous asbestos-containing sediment downstream into the foreseeable
future. Now that dredging no longer occurs regularly, sediments
accumulate in the streambed, increasing the risk of floods. Increased
flood risk can only add to the time-sensitivity requirement of a future
removal action; EPA’s 2009 testing established that flooding spreads the
hazardous sediment over a large area and effectively multiplies the
existing asbestos exposure pathways.175
Removal actions have been described as “time-sensitive responses
to public health threats for which EPA is granted considerable leeway in
structuring the cleanup.”176 The Ninth Circuit found that EPA's cleanup
in Libby, which took place over the course of years, “was a removal
action that was exempt from the temporal and monetary cap.”177 This
170. United States v. W.R. Grace & Co., 429 F.3d 1224, 1226 (9th Cir. 2005).
171. Id. at 1231.
172. Id. at 1248 n.25.
173. JEFFRY RODIN, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FIRST ACTION MEMORANDUM: REQUEST
FOR APPROVAL OF A TIME-CRITICAL REMOVAL ACTION AT THE SWIFT CREEK ASBESTOS SITE,
EVERSON, WHATCOM COUNTY, WASHINGTON 7 (2007).
174. 2007 EPA SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 24, at 2-2.
175. EPA supported its decision to conduct a removal action in Libby on the grounds that “the
asbestos . . . posed an immediate threat to the local population; a cleanup beyond the cap was required to prevent, limit, or mitigate an emergency because of the size of the cleanup and the short
construction season; and assistance from other government agencies was not anticipated on a timely
basis.” W.R. Grace & Co., 429 F.3d at 1231. Although the public health effects are nowhere near as
immediate or egregious in the Swift Creek area as in Libby, the rationales regarding the size of the
cleanup and the absence of assistance from other government agencies apply to Swift Creek.
176. Id. at 1228.
177. Id. at 1227.
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type of long-term removal action is justified at Swift Creek because the
previous dredge-and-deposit strategy of sediment management is no
longer viable or even necessarily legal, to the extent dredged creek
sediments would constitute a hazardous substance under CERCLA.
Furthermore, consultants to EPA have estimated that the annual removal
and transport of 100,000 cubic yards of Swift Creek sediment to a
repository within ten miles of the creek (if such a place existed) would
cost between $1.5 and $1.9 million per year over a period of five
years.178 The odds that any public agency will be able to commit this
level of funding to the Swift Creek problem, year after year, decade after
decade, are very long.
A continuation of status quo approaches at the site clearly would
cost too much and would not address asbestos exposure pathways
originating from the creek sediment. Further, it would not stop the
physical movement of sediment from the landslide into the creek.
Therefore, the situation at Swift Creek warrants a long-term, multi-stage
removal action.
2. State Hazardous Substances Regulation
State law also has a role to play in addressing the Swift Creek
problem. Washington State’s Model Toxics Control Act (MTCA) 179 was
“heavily patterned” after CERCLA.180 All hazardous substances listed in
CERCLA are also listed as hazardous substances under the MTCA.181
The MTCA seeks to “raise sufficient funds to clean up all hazardous
waste sites and to prevent the creation of future hazards due to improper
disposal of toxic wastes into the state's land and waters.”182 To this end,
the MTCA holds parties accountable for “irresponsible use and disposal
of hazardous substances”183 and requires the identification, investigation,
and cleanup of contaminated properties that are, or may be, a threat to
human health or the environment.184
MTCA resembles CERCLA in that “potentially liable [parties]” can
be ordered to “provide the remedial action” for release of a hazardous
substance.185 Additionally, the MTCA applies joint and several liability
178. 2007 EPA SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 24, at 3-8.
179. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.105 (2011).
180. Taliesen Corp. v. Razore Land Co., 144 P.3d 1185, 1197 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006); Pacificorp Envtl. Remediation Co. v. Wash. State Dep’t of Transp., 259 P.3d 1115, 1128 (Wash. Ct. App.
2011).
181. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 173-340-200 (2003).
182. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.105D.010(2).
183. Id.
184. Id. § 70.105D.030.
185. Id. § 70.105D.050(1).
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to “remedial action costs and . . . natural resource damages resulting
from the releases or threatened releases of hazardous substances.”186 Past
and present owners and operators of facilities, arrangers, transporters,
and sellers can all be held liable under the MTCA.187
For agencies and parties that have moved NOA-containing
materials, liability issues under the MTCA are potentially as threatening
as CERCLA liability. State courts have upheld a broader interpretation
of MTCA arranger liability, for example, concluding that intent to
dispose of a hazardous substance is not required.188
While the MTCA imposes the specter of liability, it also provides
the prospect of assistance with cleanup. It authorizes the state
Department of Ecology to conduct remedial actions “to remedy releases
or threatened releases of hazardous substances.”189 Ecology’s hazardous
waste cleanup, prevention, and management activities are funded by both
a hazardous substances tax imposed on substances including chemicals,
fertilizers, and petroleum products, as well as recovered costs from
remedial actions.190 Washington also uses these revenues to maintain a
state toxics control account for the broad purpose of “[w]ater and
environmental health protection and monitoring programs.”191 Funds
from the pollution tax are also deposited into a local toxics control
account, for distribution to local governments, with remedial actions
designated as the highest priority.192
The Washington State Legislature must appropriate all toxics
control account funds,193 and, as noted below, the legislature has directed
some funding to Swift Creek to assist with short-term stabilization
measures and the search for longer-term approach to the problem. The

186. Id. § 70.105D.040(2).
187. Id. § 70.105D.040(1)(a)"(e).
188. Pacificorp Envtl. Remediation Co. v. Wash. State Dep’t of Transp., 259 P.3d 1115, 1132
(Wash. Ct. App. 2011) (“The United States Supreme Court's interpretation of CERCLA does not
trump our state courts' interpretation of Washington's comparable Act.”) (citing Seattle City Light v.
Wash. State Dep’t of Transp., 989 P.2d 1164, 1170 (Wash. Ct. App.1999) and Modern Sewer Corp.
v. Nelson Distrib., Inc.,109 P.3d 11, 13–14 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005), review denied, 122 P.3d 186
(Wash. 2005)).
189. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.105D.030(1)(b).
190. WASH. DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, HOUSE BILL 1761: MODEL TOXICS CONTROL ACCOUNTS
TEN-YEAR FINANCING PLAN 15 (Dec. 2008), available at http://www.ecy.wa.gov/pubs/
0801044.pdf. State agencies that receive funds for hazardous waste cleanup, prevention, and management activities include the Department of Health, Department of Agriculture, Department of
Natural Resources, Washington State Patrol, Washington State Department of Transportation, and
the Puget Sound Partnership, as well as the Department of Ecology. Id.
191. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.105D.070(2)(viii).
192. Id. § 70.105D.070(3)(a).
193. Id. § 70.105D.070(4).
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legislature has neither appropriated funds for remedial action under the
MTCA nor provided funding from the hazardous substance tax.
B. The Army Corps of Engineers and Ecosystem Restoration
The possibility of a Corps ecosystem restoration194 project has been
discussed as a way to address the Swift Creek problem. Ecosystem
restoration projects “utilize engineering and other technical solutions to
water and related land resources problems, with emphasis on improving
degraded ecosystem function and structure.”195 The Corps focuses on
“restoration opportunities that are associated with wetlands, riparian[,]
and other floodplain and aquatic systems.”196 Ecosystem restoration
projects are intended to address “ecological resources, and not . . . [the
cleanup] of hazardous and toxic wastes . . . .” Under the Corps’ policies,
cleanup presumably would be one of the “components of ecosystem
restoration problems or opportunities [that] are better addressed by other
agencies through their missions and programs.”197 Projects that “consist
primarily of land acquisition are not appropriate as Civil Works
ecosystem restoration investments.”198
At the 2007 public meeting, the Corps’ Seattle Division
commander, Mike McCormick, discussed the possibility of ecosystem
restoration, including the uncertainties that surround the Corps’
jurisdiction:199
194. See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, WATER RESOURCES POLICIES AND AUTHORITIES:
CIVIL WORKS ECOSYSTEM RESTORATION POLICY 2 (Sept. 30, 1999), available at http://140.194.76.
129/publications/eng-regs/er1165-2-501/entire.pdf. (“Ecosystem Restoration is one of the primary
missions of the Civil Works program. The purpose of Civil Works ecosystem restoration activities is
to restore significant ecosystem function, structure, and dynamic processes that have been degraded.
Ecosystem restoration efforts involve a comprehensive examination of the problems contributing to
the system degradation, and the development of alternative means for their solution. The intent of
restoration is to partially or fully reestablish the attributes of a naturalistic, functioning, and selfregulating system.”).
195. Id. at 3.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. The Corps derives its authority to engage in ecosystem restoration projects from a number
of sources:
a. Study authorities through which the Corps can examine ecosystem restoration
needs and opportunities include: 1) congressionally authorized studies pursued under
General Investigations (i.e., new start reconnaissance and feasibility studies for singlepurpose ecosystem restoration or multiple purpose projects which include ecosystem restoration as a purpose); 2) General Reevaluation Reports and reformulation opportunities
in conjunction with significant Post-Authorization Change Reports; 3) Section 216, Review of Completed Projects (River and Harbor and Flood Control Act of 1970); 4) major
rehabilitation of existing projects; and 5) Section 22, Planning Assistance to States (Water Resources Development Act (WRDA) 1974, as amended).
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I have authority to do the ecosystem restoration. Is this an
ecosystem restoration project? Don't know. One of the requirements
of course is that I have a local sponsor in addition to having a
federal. I'm the federal sponsor, but I need to have a local sponsor
whether that's the state, DNR, or whether that's a local agency, the
county. It requires that. If there is—that's an authority. I don't know
if this qualifies for ecosystem restoration, but even if it did I'd still
need a local sponsor.200

The requirements for local sponsors vary, depending on the source
of authority for the ecosystem restoration project. Local sponsors must
provide from twenty-five to forty percent of the project cost, depending
on the circumstances; the extent to which in-kind contributions can be
used to meet the local share varies.201 The process is competitive, as
Commander McCormick described:
How we get a local sponsor is we get a letter from a local sponsor
saying they're willing to contribute a certain percentage depending
on the type of study that we're going after or what portion of the
process we're in. And it differs, but essentially somewhere around
35, 40 percent is provided by the local sponsor and then the federal
government, then we go in and we certainly talk to the
congressional delegation and then the congressional delegation
funds us for the federal portion, the federal share, and it is across
the entire country where this 4.8 billion dollars worth of civil works
appropriation money gets chopped up into various programs. And if
this thing makes the cut, there is a federal chunk of money put into
it. If the member of the Senate or a member of the House has
enough pull to actually get the federal money applied, that takes
care of the federal portion, but the local portion has to be provided
by something that's not federal. . . . Someone has to write a letter
saying we're willing to contribute 30, 40 percent of whatever this
b. Authorities through which the Corps can participate in the study, design, and implementation of ecosystem restoration and protection projects include: 1) Section 1135,
Project Modifications for Improvement of the Environment (Water Resources Development Act (WRDA) of 1986, as amended); 2) Section 206, Aquatic Ecosystem Restoration (WRDA 1996 ); 3) Section 204 Beneficial Uses of Dredged Material (WRDA 1992,
as amended); and, 4) dredging of contaminated sediments under Section 312 of WRDA
1990, as amended.
c. Additional opportunities for ecosystem restoration and protection may also be
pursued through existing project authorities for the management of operating projects;
e.g., through water control changes or as part of natural resources management.
Id. at 2.
200. Nov. 2007 Transcript, supra note 1, at 36.
201. The Corps’ ecosystem restoration policy spells out these obligations, which depend on
whether the project is congressionally authorized or if it falls under various provisions of the Water
Resources Development Act of 1986. See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, supra note 194, at 4.
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study and then later on at the end of the day, at the end of the study
if there is an answer to the problem, then it gets authorized. At the
end there's a chief's report by the chief of engineers, he signs off on,
it gets authorized by congress, and then appropriations get applied
for construction.202

Ecosystem restoration efforts are grounded in a benefit-cost
analysis “involv[ing] a comprehensive examination of the problems
contributing to the system degradation, and the development of
alternative means for their solution.”203 This assessment considers
monetary and non-monetary benefits, and follows “[t]he general
guidance in the Economic and Environmental Principles and Guidelines
for Water and Related Land Resources Implementation Studies
(P&G).”204 The P&G is “intended to ensure proper and consistent
planning by Federal agencies in the formulation and evaluation of water
and related land resources implementation studies.”205 Under those
guidelines, the Corps must analyze “all reasonable alternatives,”
including “[a] plan that reasonably maximizes net national economic
development benefits.”206
National economic development (NED) is defined as “the net value
of the national output of goods and services, expressed in monetary
units.”207 The importance of NED in this assessment emphasizes the
benefit-cost nature of the Corps’ ecosystem restoration process.
Although the P&G provide that the assessment should include “[o]ther
plans which reduce net NED benefits in order to further address other
Federal, State, local, and international concerns,”208 and the Corps’
ecosystem restoration policy guidance states that “measures do not need
to exhibit net national economic development . . . benefits and should be
viewed on the basis of non-monetary outputs compatible with the P&G
selection criteria,”209 competition for limited resources is stiff, and the
benefit-cost calculus is a significant factor. In general, the benefit-cost
analysis process is problematic because “knowledge of the costs,

202. Nov. 2007 Transcript, supra note 1, at 53–54.
203. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, supra note 194, at 2.
204. Id. at 5.
205. U.S. WATER RES. COUNCIL, ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND
GUIDELINES FOR WATER AND RELATED LAND RESOURCES IMPLEMENTATION STUDIES, at iv (Mar.
10, 1983), available at ftp://ftp-fc.sc.egov.usda.gov/Economics/priceindexes/Data/PrinciplesAndGui
delinesLocalSite.pdf (indicating that the P&G applies to Corps (Civil Works), Bureau of Reclamation, Tennessee Valley Authority, and Soil Conservation Service water resources project plans).
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, supra note 194, at 5.
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benefits, impacts, and interactions is rarely precise.” 210 These problems
are magnified in the case of Swift Creek, where costs are extremely high
and benefits are extremely difficult to quantify in the light of the
uncertainties surrounding exposure to NOA and its health effects.
Representatives of Washington’s congressional delegation are not
optimistic that the Corps will identify any viable alternatives that meet
its benefit-cost standards.211 If it were calculated that several human lives
would be saved from asbestos-related deaths through an ecosystem
restoration project, a “savings” that might be calculated at around $7
million per death,212 and that property damage from flooding would be
averted, it is nevertheless unlikely that these “benefits” would outweigh
the project costs for mitigation, which have been roughly estimated at
more than $100 million.213 Under this calculus, it is difficult to see how
assisting a sparsely-populated area would make the cost-benefit cut.
The availability of the required local contributions presents an
equally significant barrier. Between 1998 and 2007, Whatcom County
spent approximately $1.4 million on Swift Creek management activities,
averaging approximately $140,000 per year.214 In 2009, the Washington
State Legislature allocated $1 million for the cleanup of Swift Creek.215
The required contribution of between twenty-five and forty percent of
the restoration costs, if applied to the ballpark figure of $100 million
contemplates a required local expenditure of $25 to $40 million.
Compared to the few million dollars currently spent locally, this level of
expenditure would represent an enormous escalation of funding for the
Swift Creek asbestos problem.

210. IGOR LINKOV ET AL., COMPARATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION
MAKING 15 (2004).
211. Interview by Douglas Naftz with Luke Loeffler, supra note 159.
212. David Fahrenthold, Cosmic Markdown: EPA Says Life Is Worth Less, WASH. POST, July
19, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/18/AR2008071803235.h
tml (emphasizing that according to new EPA estimates, the value of a ‘statistical human life’ is
$7.22 million).
213. This figure comes from a newspaper quote from an interview with a Whatcom County
geologist. No agency calculations of the cost of mitigation appear to be publicly available. See Sam
Taylor, State May Help Dredge Swift Creek, BELLINGHAM WASH. HERALD, Mar. 26, 2008,
available at http://www.redorbit.com/news/science/1312445/state_may_help_dredge_swift_creek/.
214. KERR WOOD LEIDAL, supra note 10, at 3-8.
215. WHATCOM CNTY. COUNCIL, AGREEMENT NO. 201003023, INTERAGENCY AGREEMENT
BETWEEN THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DEPARTMENT OF ECOLOGY AND WHATCOM COUNTY FLOOD
CONTROL ZONE DISTRICT 1 (Jan. 19, 2010), available at http://www.co.whatcom.wa.us/council/agr
eements/2010/201003023.pdf.
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C. County and City Authority
At the local level, Whatcom County and the small cities affected by
Swift Creek and the Sumas River have land use planning and zoning
authority that could minimize human exposure to NOA by reducing
population densities in the vicinity of the NOA. Perhaps reflecting their
constituents’ skepticism about the degree of harm posed by asbestosladen soils, however, local governments appear reluctant to restrict land
uses in areas affected by NOA. For example, only months after EPA
found high levels of asbestos in floodplain sediments, the county council
designated land in the Sumas River floodplain for urban-density
growth.216 This decision was not made inadvertently; the local
governments received testimony regarding the presence of asbestosladen soils in this area and requests that the affected area be omitted
from the urban growth boundaries.217 This decision demonstrates both
the difficulty of coordinating the activities of different levels of
government and the problems that local government officials face in
weighing property rights against long-term risk.
Washington State law also requires local governments, including
Whatcom County, to designate geologically hazardous areas using the
“best available science.”218 Regulations define “geologically hazardous
areas” as “areas susceptible to erosion, sliding, earthquake, or other
geological events. They pose a threat to the health and safety of citizens
when incompatible commercial, residential, or industrial development is
sited in areas of significant hazard.”219 The regulations further state that,
“[w]hen technology cannot reduce risks to acceptable levels, building in
geologically hazardous areas is best avoided.”220
Whatcom County’s current Comprehensive Plan only designates
the Swift Creek alluvial fan, an area of approximately 495 acres,221 as a

216. WHATCOM CNTY. COUNCIL, WHATCOM COUNTY COUNCIL ACTION TAKEN (Nov. 24,
2009), available at http://www.co.whatcom.wa.us/council/meetings/council/actiontaken/pastactionta
ken/2009/at1124.pdf (referencing approval of an “[o]rdinance amending Whatcom County Code
Title 20, the Official Whatcom County Zoning map, and the Whatcom County Comprehensive Plan
and maps”); see also WHATCOM CNTY. COUNCIL, WHATCOM COUNTY COUNCIL AGENDA BILL
451, 843 (Nov. 17, 2009), available at http://www.co.whatcom.wa.us/council/meetings/council/pack
et/archived/2009/packet1124.pdf (including text of ordinance including the affected area and a map
of the affected area).
217. Whatcom County did add a policy related to asbestos: “This area will be kept in reserve
status until the County has determined that development will not expose future residents and employees to unacceptable risk from naturally occurring asbestos.” Id. at 545.
218. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.172 (2011).
219. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 365-190-080(4)(a) (2010) (emphasis added).
220. Id.
221. KERR WOOD LEIDAL, supra note 10, at 2-4.
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geologically hazardous area.222 Based on EPA’s sampling results from
the 2009 flood, which showed highly elevated levels of asbestos in
sediments along the Sumas River, the best available science seems to
indicate that the geologically hazardous area designation should be
extended to include other affected areas.223 Concerns about property
values would make such a designation politically unpopular, however,
and Whatcom County has not indicated any interest in using
comprehensive planning to address the problem.
V. THE RANGE OF SOLUTIONS
[Q]uick and efficient cleanup of hazardous material eliminates risks to
people and the environment and minimizes the stigma contamination can
bring to properties and communities.
—EPA, The Emergency Response and Removal Program.224

And with it being such a health risk, you would think that that would
play into it because this is a national health risk is what I’m hearing
today. So why are our hands tied and the money tied up? I don’t
understand that. If it’s such a health concern, why isn’t there the money
for this county not to be this big of a risk? And if you can’t answer that,
it’s like where do we go next? What are we going to do?
—Tammy Rawls, Resident, Whatcom County. 225

I’m here for a solution. I’m not here to find out how bad this stuff is or
how good this stuff is or what we can or can’t do with this. I want a
solution instead of all these things. It’s redundant to bring them up again,
but we can’t get one agency here to come up with a solution. Nobody
has.
—Edward Bosscher, Resident, Whatcom County. 226
222. WHATCOM CNTY. COUNCIL, WHATCOM COUNTY COMPREHENSIVE PLAN, at Map 27
(June 2008), available at http://www.co.whatcom.wa.us/pds/planning/comp_plan/pdf/20110101chapter-11.pdf (showing the Swift Creek alluvial fan designated as an “Alluvial Fan Hazard Area”).
223. Id. at 11-11. This would be consistent with Whatcom County Comprehensive Plan Goal
11-D:
Minimize potential loss of life, damage to property, the expenditure of public funds and
degradation of natural systems resulting from development in hazardous areas such as
floodplains, landslide-prone areas, . . . potentially dangerous alluvial fans and other
known natural hazards by advocating the use of land acquisition, open space taxation,
conservation easements, growth planning, and other options to discourage development
in such areas.
224. United States v. W.R. Grace & Co., 429 F.3d 1224, 1248 (9th Cir. 2005).
225. Nov. 2007 Transcript, supra note 1, at 54.
226. Id. at 34–35.
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From the perspective of many residents affected by Swift Creek
asbestos, government agencies arrived on the scene, proclaimed that
NOA is a health hazard, and then moved on without solving the problem.
From the perspective of agency officials, the scope and nature of the
Swift Creek problem demands a response, but the lack of clear legal
authority and the paucity of available resources stymie efforts to address
the long-term needs of the region. Furthermore, as discussed, no single
agency has the authority to tackle every aspect of the Swift Creek
problem. As one Whatcom County representative stated, “it’s like a
Hydra, the heads are moving.”227
Under these circumstances, federal, state and local approaches to
the problem will have to be coordinated in order to approach the asbestos
problem from a number of angles and to extend the reach of scarce
resources. In a 2009 press release, EPA recognized the need for
simultaneous application of a variety of solutions. Noting that
“[e]ngineering options—including building a structure that would
control sediment near the landslide—are being considered,” the agency
explained that “[t]he situation may also call for changes to local land use
planning.”228
The most popular approach probably is the engineered solution,
which would be intended to prevent asbestos-laden soils from entering
Swift Creek or from being distributed through flooding. Residents
naturally hope that the problem can be controlled at its source in a way
that does not depreciate property values or require the residents to
change their lifestyles. One engineering alternative involves the
construction of a large debris stabilization basin in the alluvial fan of
Swift Creek. In 1971, the Corps selected this approach as the most
feasible of three potential alternatives; but the concept failed to survive
the requisite cost-benefit analysis.229 Subsequent studies have continued
to propose ways to contain sediment, either as a long-term or short-term
approach to the problem.
To date, the most thorough geotechnical study of the Swift Creek
region remains the 1976 Soil Conservation Service study. The purpose of
this study was to “make a preliminary evaluation of the feasibility of
retarding the landslide movement via a landslide control structure or
other means and for determining the size, type and location of a potential

227. Id. at 57 (quoting Jon Hutchings, Assistant Dir. of Pub. Works, Whatcom Cnty.).
228. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NATURALLY-OCCURRING ASBESTOS FOUND IN SUMAS
RIVER DOWNSTREAM OF SWIFT CREEK (July 20, 2009), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/ad
mpress.nsf/0/0F93B0BF4981377C852575F9007AE5FE.
229. KERR WOOD LEIDAL, supra note 10, at 2-10 to -12.

2012] The Emerging Legal Problem of Naturally Occurring Asbestos 173
sediment debris basin(s) located on the Swift Creek floodplain.”230 This
report identified a range of alternative solutions.231
As outlined in the study’s purpose statement, two possibilities were
evaluated in detail: a landslide control structure and sedimentation
basins. The landslide control structure “would contain the debris at the
source by means of an earth buttress constructed at the face of the
landslide above the Swift Creek ‘narrows.’ ”232 This buttress would be
1075 feet in length and would require excavating fourteen million cubic
yards of landslide material and the re-use of thirteen million cubic yards
as fill.233 Even in 1976, without accounting for the costs of worker
protection while excavating asbestos-laden sediments or the costs of the
disposal of the sediments, this engineering alternative was recognized to
be too expensive to pursue any further.234
In light of the high costs of constructing a landslide control
structure, sedimentation basins emerged as the favored engineering
approach. Sediment basins are constructed to “reduce the volume of
sediment transported, reduce the incidence of overbank flooding and the
related flood plain sediment deposition.”235 Potential sites for two basins
were identified.236 Excavated on-site soils from the sedimentation basins
were proposed as the source of materials to build embankments and
dikes. These materials consist of alluvial fan and flood channel
deposits,237 now known to contain asbestos.

230. CONVERSE DAVIS DIXON ASSOCS., INC., FINAL GEOTECHNICAL REPORT: SWIFT CREEK
TRIBUTARIES, SUMAS RIVER WATERSHED, WHATCOM COUNTY, WASHINGTON PT. II, at 2 (Jan. 15,
1976) (on file with author) (referenced in text as the “1976 Geotechnical Report”).
231. Id. at 14–16. Two of these alternatives, “slide stabilization” and “drainage diversions
from slide[-]area,” were considered clearly infeasible. Slide stabilization would involve “internal
drainage of the ground water within and beneath the slide mass” by some means or “soil solidification or grouting to solidify and strengthen the slide material.” Id. The report noted that sufficient
information about subsurface conditions and the cause of the movement was not available and that
in any event, “no case is known where such methods have been successfully applied to a landslide of
this magnitude.” Id. at 14–15. “Drainage diversion,” related to the fact that stream flows on both
sides of the slide-area, as well as runoff on the slide-area itself, results in erosion of the slide-area
and transport of slide materials to the floodplain. “Diversion of the streams or runoff into these
streams from the upstream watershed by conduits, channels, dams and pumping, etc., was considered impossible from a sound engineering aspect and economics.” Id. at 15. Steep topography and
site conditions prevent an inter-basin transfer, while the crushing forces of the shifting of geologic
formations would destroy collection and diversion structures.
232. Id. at 27.
233. Id. at 28.
234. Id. at 29.
235. Id. at 31.
236. Id. at 32.
237. Id. at 35. The report predicted embankments of thirty-five and twenty-five feet for Basin
A and Basin B, respectively, would result in a trap efficiency of from seventy-five to ninety percent.
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The report estimated that the total project cost would be $3.6
million, with annual operation and maintenance costs of $568,000.238
Adjusting for inflation, the project cost today would be approximately
$15 million, with an annual operating cost of $2.4 million.239 Of course,
costs have changed over time. Even if some processes can be done more
efficiently and some materials may be relatively cheaper, the fact that the
1975 estimate did not include worker protection for handling hazardous
asbestos-laden material is a countervailing factor. To help put these costs
in perspective, EPA’s costs in 2007 for spraying dust suppressant,
stockpile grading, and bank armoring were approximately $250,000.240
Additionally, EPA estimated that the cost of removing 100,000 cubic
yards of sediment per year for five years, and transporting it to a
repository within ten miles—if such a place existed—would be between
$1.5 and $1.9 million.241
The involved agencies have acknowledged that this type of largescale engineering solution is not economically feasible. In 2009, EPA,
Ecology, and Whatcom County entered into a Joint Agency Agreement
based on the premise that “[t]he agencies have concluded that engineered
facilities to stop the erosion and deposition of Sumas Mountain
sediments near their source are prohibitively costly and require resources
far beyond those available to State and Local governments, and that
Federal programs do not presently allow for spending of this
magnitude.”242 The engineered solution currently under consideration is
far more modest than the solution proposed in 1975. The Washington
State Legislature allocated $1 million from the local toxics control
account in 2009 “solely to clean up naturally occurring asbestos from
Swift Creek.”243 Whatcom County and Ecology agreed to use the funds
primarily for the management and improvement of the existing sediment
piles on the side of Swift Creek, designated as “levees,” and for the
design and construction of new levees and retention facilities. The
parties also agreed to use the funds for floodplain easement, land
acquisition, and geotechnical investigation of long-term solutions.244
238. Id. at Appendix A.
239. Inflation Calculator, DOLLARTIMES, http://www.dollartimes.com/calculators/inflation.ht
m (input “3,600,000” into “$” box; then choose “1975” in the following drop-box; then choose
“2010” in the drop-box under “Convert to $”; then follow “Calculate” hyperlink).
240. KERR WOOD LEIDAL, supra note 10, at 3-8.
241. Id.
242. WHATCOM CNTY. COUNCIL, WASH. STATE DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, JOINT AGENCY AGREEMENT: NATURALLY OCCURRING ASBESTOS ORIGINATING FROM
THE SUMAS MOUNTAIN LANDSLIDE IN WASHINGTON STATE 1 (Aug. 31, 2009).
243. WHATCOM CNTY. COUNCIL, AGREEMENT NO. 201003023, supra note 215.
244. Id. at 6.
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Whatcom County has since acquired property intended for the
disposal of asbestos-containing sediment245—apparently skirting, or
having received reassurances about, liability issues. It has also approved
a sediment management plan for the construction of levees and
excavated sediment basins with berms. Specifically, Whatcom County
proposed the construction of two large basins on a seventy-acre site
located in the existing Swift Creek alluvial fan. The basins would have a
storage capacity of approximately two million cubic yards of
sediment.246 Containment levees would be “offset from the banks of
Swift Creek channel,” in order to contain larger debris flows and
sediment from flooding events.247
The estimated cost for basin design, permitting, and construction is
$4.6 million, with $2.5 million estimated for levee design and
construction. The repair and maintenance costs are estimated at $250,000
per year.248 While these costs greatly exceed any funding that has been
dedicated to, or identified for, Swift Creek to date, it should further be
noted that these engineering features are not viewed as permanent
solutions. Landslide stabilization, optimistically priced at $150,000 to $4
million, is identified as a long-term goal.249
Based on the current situation, it appears that the agencies are not
anticipating that a Corps-sponsored ecosystem restoration will rescue
Swift Creek. The Corps would be the logical lead agency for an
engineered solution. Not only is the Corps experienced in large-scale
engineering projects, but its ecosystem restoration authority is focused
on water systems. In contrast to EPA, which has CERCLA authority
more clearly authorized to address NOA handled by humans, the Corps’
ecosystem restoration authority is intended to avoid hazardous waste
issues and to work to improve natural systems. An engineering approach
led by the Corps could address the source of the Swift Creek asbestos
problem. Realistically, however, both the feasibility and the cost make a
large-scale engineering solution unlikely.
Reflecting the dearth of solutions, EPA tends to emphasize smallscale, local policies. On its Swift Creek website, EPA notes:
[I]n El Dorado County, California, for example, local land-use
permits require geologic study and documentation of construction
and waste management practices. In Fairfax County, Virginia, a
245. Sam Taylor, Whatcom Officials OK Buying Lot for Asbestos Sediment from Swift Creek
Area, THE BELLINGHAM HERALD, Sept. 29, 2010.
246. SEDIMENT MANAGEMENT PLAN, supra note 9, at 11.
247. Id. at 12.
248. Id. at 6.
249. Id.
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plan must be approved before construction occurs. In the future,
local or state level changes, similar to this, will likely be needed in
areas affected by asbestos carried downstream from Sumas
Mountain landslide.250

In conjunction with the local governments’ planning and zoning
authority, these local controls might help to reduce risk. El Dorado and
Fairfax County are unlike the Swift Creek area, however, because the
asbestos in those locations is in the ground and the rocks. It is not
transported, by a river delivery system, and there is no landslide
providing a continuous source of asbestos-laden sediments.
Rather than trying to stop the asbestos from moving, or engaging in
low-level mitigation measures that may or may not reduce risk and harm,
the agencies need to determine whether the Swift Creek geologically
hazardous area is simply incompatible with human settlement. Given the
unique temporal and geographic scope of NOA distribution in the Swift
Creek area, the most protective and inexpensive option might be simply
to purchase affected properties.
A land-purchase solution would likely put EPA in the lead, based
on its response authority under CERCLA. This would be an innovative
approach. Although permanent relocation of residents at a CERCLA
cleanup site is not unprecedented, such relocation has not occurred
during a removal action at a site that is neither listed nor pending listing
on the NPL. Based on the broad statutory deference offered to EPA
through the inclusive language of CERCLA, however, permanent
relocation is certainly not outside the realm of policy options at EPA’s
disposal when carrying out a complex removal action.251
The definition of a remedial action under CERCLA provides insight
into the types of situations that might warrant relocation:
[T]he costs of permanent relocation of residents and businesses and
community facilities where the President determines that, alone or
in combination with other measures, such relocation is more costeffective than and environmentally preferable to the transportation,
storage, treatment, destruction, or secure disposition offsite of

250. Frequently Asked Questions about Sumas Mountain Asbestos, Swift Creek and
Sumas River, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Aug. 26, 2009), http://yosemite.epa.gov/r10/cleanup.nsf/
sites/sumasmtnfaq.
251. The lists of example removal actions outlined under CERCLA in 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23),
and in the NCP under 40 C.F.R. § 300.415(e) are not exhaustive, and act as a “general rule” for what
removal actions might include. Given the broad statutory deference offered to EPA, it is likely that
even property acquisition, which normally occurs in remedial actions, could be utilized under a
complex removal action.
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hazardous substances, or may otherwise be necessary to protect the
public health or welfare . . . .252

Using this definition as a guide, a rough estimate can be prepared of
the cost of relocating property owners affected by Swift Creek NOA.
The assessed value of all properties within a quarter-mile buffer zone
around the creek can be calculated by using data from Whatcom County
and Geographic Information Systems software. Based on total assessed
property values from 2007,253 the seventy-one properties within a
quarter-mile buffer zone of Swift Creek are worth approximately
$7,673,790. In contrast, the cost of dredging, transportation, and disposal
of hazardous sediment from Swift Creek over a period of 400 years or
more can be roughly estimated at two million dollars per year.254
Permanent relocation of homeowners near Swift Creek is therefore a
viable policy alternative. A dredge-and-deposit strategy of sediment
management exceeds permanent relocation costs after only four years.
Thus, as a means of eliminating asbestos exposure pathways over a long
period of time, permanent relocation would be the most cost-effective
method.
Additionally, permanent relocation addresses another important
exposure pathway—indoor exposure to asbestos from Swift Creek.255
Although EPA has identified indoor air exposure as a risk factor, indoor
exposure has not been quantified or incorporated into EPA’s risk
calculations. It is possible that harmful asbestos-containing sediment
from Swift Creek has accumulated in homes, where residents inhale it
for longer durations than would occur during outdoor exposure. Indoor
exposure may also result from the local transport and use of Swift Creek
sediments as fill material. Thus, as indicated by EPA and the
Washington Department of Health, it is possible that NOA exists in
driveways and other residential areas near sites where the fill was
252. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24) (2010).
253. Total assessed value includes value of built structures, land, and any resource value that
may exist on the site.
254. KERR WOOD LEIDAL, supra note 10, at 3-8. This cost estimation incorporated several important assumptions, including the ability to remove and export 20,000 cubic yards of hazardous
dredged sediment per year to a disposal site within ten miles. Under these conditions, it was estimated that over a five-year period, 100,000 cubic yards of hazardous sediment (the estimated volume of
stockpiled sediment currently residing at the site) could be removed and disposed off site for between $1.5 and $1.9 million per year, with transportation costs accounting for between twenty and
thirty percent of the total cost.
255. According to the Washington Department of Health, “[r]isk estimates may in fact be underestimated because exposures may occur at other locations such as indoor environments of residences near Swift Creek.” PUBLIC HEALTH EVALUATION, supra note 121, at 13. Additionally, properties downstream (including those on the Sumas River) are “areas where questions remain about
non-occupational exposure.” Id. at 11.
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used.256 Compared to the dredge-and-deposit solution, which only
mitigates exposure within the immediate vicinity of the creek, permanent
relocation could eliminate exposure within homes as well as exposure
from sediments in and surrounding the creek.
Property owners may resist permanent relocation. On the other
hand, they may recognize that relocation provides proactive mitigation of
decreasing property values caused by the presence and stigma of NOA.
Washington law requires the disclosure of asbestos in or on a residential
property when it is sold.257 The free market may well provide a more
draconian solution than the proposed purchase of properties affected by
NOA. The depreciation process has been aptly described as follows:
One issue that may come and be disclosed by the seller is the
presence of or concerns about environmental contamination on the
property. Once this topic is introduced, the buyer-seller
conversation is altered away from positive attributes of the property
to a potentially deal-killing topic while the potential buyer assesses
their taste for environmental risk. In many cases, the potential buyer
will walk away from a contaminated property, especially if the
property is not uniquely excellent and if there are some
uncontaminated substitutes for it. Hence, this substitution effect acts
to depress demand for the property, driving down the sales price.258

Free market proponents might argue that the market should control
the price of properties affected by NOA. After all, properties with
quicksand or fault lines are worth less than other properties, and NOA is
equally a result of natural forces. Looking at the situation from the
property owners’ perspective, however, the situation is more equivalent
to an innocent landowner affected by a Superfund site. Landowners
affected by Swift Creek NOA did nothing wrong, and they are exposed
to health risks that the government has determined to be unacceptable.
Superfund law, however, revolves around the liability of a
responsible party. As a result, it not only fails to provide a clear path
forward in many situations involving NOA, but it can actually chill
agency action, with the unintended consequence of exposing citizens to

256. Id. at 11; see also HEALTH CONSULTATION, supra note 12, at 2-2.
257. WASH. REV. CODE § 64.06.020 (2011). Required “environmental” disclosures include the
following: “Are there any substances, materials, or products in or on the property that may be environmental concerns, such as asbestos, formaldehyde, radon gas, lead-based paint, fuel or chemical
storage tanks, or contaminated soil or water?” The seller may check “Yes,” “No,” or “Don’t know.”
If “Yes” is checked, the seller must explain the answer. Although buyers may waive disclosure, the
“environmental” disclosures must be provided if the answer would be “Yes.” WASH. REV. CODE §
64.06.010(7).
258. ROBERT A. SIMONS, WHEN BAD THINGS HAPPEN TO GOOD PROPERTY 37 (2006).
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greater risks.259 Nonetheless, if agencies are willing to interpret it
aggressively to protect public health, existing law can lead to a solution
for exposure to naturally occurring asbestos. The unspoken issue is
whether our society will view this problem as a communal issue,
requiring an investment of societal resources, or if individuals will be left
to bear the brunt of the problem.
As a slow-moving emergency that confronts a relatively small and
conflicted constituency, the pressure for leadership on NOA is muted.
Thus, the problem is likely to sort itself out through market-choice
mechanisms. Property values will provide a rough reflection of the risk
of asbestos exposure. Those who cannot afford to live anywhere else, or
who discount the risk, will remain in areas with NOA.
If Swift Creek is a guide, citizens will have great difficulty making
individual risk assessments in the face of the complexity of the health
effects of asbestos, with its long latency period and uncertainties about
exposure. No matter their generalized view of the role of government,
affected residents will tend to assume that the government will protect
their health from identified hazards. As an anonymous commentator
wrote on the local newspaper’s web site:
Well, well, well . . . Until you have it all over YOUR property, your
driveways/roads after flooding, and all over the inside of your
home, . . . you have no idea how much it impacts your life, your
property value, your future and your ability to sell your property
when you are no longer able to run a farm and no one will buy it
because it is contaminated with the stuff . . . .
We would be more than happy to let the county buy our property at
the “before” contamination value, and let nature take it's course. No
people living here—no health concerns. I'd rather not be that guinea
pig for you all. Thanks!260

Unfortunately for the anonymous commentator, the harsher calculus
of cost-benefit analysis, rather than the assumed social contract of
government protection, is likely to determine the outcome of the Swift
Creek NOA problem. New laws specific to the context of NOA, as well
as additional scientific understanding of asbestos would, of course, help
to protect citizens in all areas affected by NOA. Further research
regarding the health impacts of short asbestos fibers, as well as
additional work on indoor and outdoor exposure to NOA, would help
citizens and regulators to understand the risks of NOA. Federal or state
259. See supra Part IV.A.1.
260. Doghouse333, Comment to Whatcom Officials OK Buying Lot for Asbestos Sediment
from Swift Creek Area, THE BELLINGHAM HERALD, Sept. 30, 2010.
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laws requiring NOA to be addressed as a geological hazard would
provide local governments with a template, and would help local
governments to implement rational land use controls that balance their
constituents’ immediate concerns about property rights and property
values.
If and when NOA rises to a level of priority that pushes the
government to act, these are all actions that would help to eliminate the
“seam between the authorities” in which the players in the Swift Creek
drama find themselves. In the meantime, the real estate market will
continue to apply its rough justice, while agencies, scientists, and
residents continue to scramble to balance long-term concerns against
short-term economic realities. These efforts, and the work of
communities around the country, are the laboratories of experimentation
that will lead to a more rational, less ad hoc approach to the difficult
legal and health issues raised by naturally occurring asbestos.

